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PREFACE

Montana's Indians are a diverse group of more than
10 tribes living on seven Indian reservations. Each tribe is
different, and so is each reservation. Cultures vary.
Economies vary. So does natural resource wealth; some
Indians are desperately poor, others relatively rich.
The problems facing Montana's Indians are terribly
complex and stem from more than a century of wide-ranging
and often damaging federal policies. Indian problems are
compounded by confusion resulting from the clash of numerous
governmental jurisdictions as two cultures — the whites and
the Indians — compete for valuable land and resources, and,
in the case of religion, people's souls.
Many reservation Indians themselves add to their
collective problems through political in-fighting. Some
reservation Indians create other problems by rejecting the
outside world. Attempting to bar all outside influences from
reservation life may seem like a way to preserve Indian
culture, but it can only result in the economic termination
of a particulular tribe. Without a healthy economy, there
can be little hope for cultural survival.
Other problems are created far from Montana — in
Washington, D.C., for example, where current federal Indian
policy is formed, or in the Middle East, where a significant
portion of the world's oil reserves hang in the balance.
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As the world energy market changes, so too does the value of
Montana Indians' oil, gas, and coal.
Montana's Indians are also inextricably tied to
their state, and vice versa. The current statewide recession
in agriculture and resource industries has hurt everyone,
regardless of race. Indians play a vital role in determining
the fate of almost 10 percent of Montana's geography. They
own a variety of resources and play increasingly important
roles in local and regional economies. Yet, unfortunately,
relations between Indian governments and state or county
governments remains poor.
Graduate research presented in this paper looks at a
variety of these problems and how Montana's Indians are
dealing with them in these changing times. Three issues —
political self-determination (self-rule), economic develop
ment, and natural resource management — are examined as
they come together on Montana's seven reservations.
Throughout this paper, economic development is defined as
sustainable growth, the sort of which will prevent
exploitation of the land or its people. Further, the concept
of economic development must be broad enough to include
human development, because economic development without
human development is exploitation.
The paper is divided into two parts, plus an
introduction and a conclusion. The introduction provides an
overview of the current economic and political situation
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found on reservations in Montana. Part One takes a closer
look at eastern Montana's six reservations with a chapter on
each. Part Two is devoted entirely to the Flathead Indian
Reservation in western Montana.
The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the
Flathead Reservation have been singled out for a number of
reasons, the most important being that they have put
together the best reservation economy in the state, and are
perhaps the closest to reaching the goal of self-rule. It is
hoped that other reservations might look to the Salish and
Kootenai as a possible model for success.
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INTRODUCTION

AN OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONDITIONS
ON MONTANA'S SEVEN INDIAN RESERVATIONS

Common Problems and Trends
Found in Indian Governments Today

Montana is Indian country, and if Indian leaders
like Kenneth Ryan have anything to say about their future,
it will remain Indian country.
"We've been starved, we've been cheated, we've been
given disease — but we're not going to go away," says Ryan,
chairman of the oil-rich Assiniboine and Sioux tribes of
northeastern Montana's Fort Peck Reservation.^
Ryan and tribal leaders across the Big Sky like to
talk in terms of persistence, adaptability, and survival. It
is significant, they say, that Montana's 49,000 Indians
continue to exist a century after having lost most of their
land to whites, and after living under federal policies they
say have been designed to destroy rather than build.
Their vision of the future demands economic selfsufficiency, a tremendous task given that the federal
government annually spends $2.5 billion nationwide on this
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country's 1.5 million Native Americans. 2 And their vision
includes the survival of cultures steeped in traditional
ties to the land, spiritualism, respect for elders, and a
sense of community.
Goals of self sufficiency are, however, proving to
be allusive throughout what's known as Indian country. While
some reservations in the United States are further developed
than others, Montana tribes generally remain as they have
for more than a century: dependent, to varying degrees, upon
the federal government for the essential requirements of
life: food, shelter, and health care. Statistics from the
Bureau of Indian Affairs and tribal governments show social
and economic pain unmatched elsewhere in Montana.^ High
student drop-out rates, widespread unemployment, poverty,
alcoholism and related diseases — these and other social
barometers all indicate that Native Americans are among the
most disadvantaged minorities in Montana, and America.'*
Bureau of Indian Affairs statistics from 1985 report
unemployment figures ranging from 27 percent on the Flathead
Indian Reservation to 78 percent on the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation.^ The BIA reported unemployment on three other
reservations — Rocky Boy's, Crow, and Northern Cheyenne —
at greater than 60 percent, while Fort Peck Reservation
unemployment was listed as 40 percent and Blackfeet
Reservation unemployment at 36 percent.®
But tribal leaders say BIA figures are too

optimistic. Government statistics do not take into account
the large number of Indians who, out of despair, have
dropped out of the workforce altogether, or who for other
reasons are never counted, tribal leaders contend. They also
say economic conditions have worsened since 1985.
For example, the Blackfeet tribal government reports
actual unemployment on its reservation at 60 percent, while
Crow and Rocky Boy's tribal governments each report 85
percent unemployment.^
Poverty statistics are similar to those for
unemployment. The federal government reports that the number
of Indians living in poverty on Montana's reservations
ranges betwen 35 percent and 50 percent, yet tribal leaders
acknowledge much higher statistics.® Crow tribal chairman
Richard Real Bird says that more than 95 percent of all
Indian homes on his reservation receive some form of
Q

welfare.'
For comparison, unemployment nationwide for all
races is about 7 percent, while the nationwide poverty rate
for all races is about 14 percent.*®
Reservation economies have been plagued by federal
budget cuts and falling tribal revenues from natural
resources such as coal, oil, gas, and timber. Sagging
agricultural markets have also hurt the reservations, as
they have the entire state of Montana. Meanwhile, economic
conditions are expected to get worse before they improve, as
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the state-wide recession continues.
Donald "Louis" Clayborn, the state of Montana's
Indian affairs coordinator, says that some tribal
governments have made economic and political gains in recent
years, but most will continue to find it nearly impossible
to find enough capital to spur economic develop
ment.**
Indians are concerned about federal budget cuts.
According to Clayborn, federal policies under the Reagan
administration have been "tantamount to economic
termination" of the reservations.
National budget figures for the two largest Indian
agencies (BIA and Indian Health Service) show that their
combined spending levels of about $1.6 billion are nearly
the same in 1987 as they were in 1979, the last year of
Jimmy Carter's presidency.* 2 However, double-digit inflation
in the early 1980s and an inflation rate of about 4 percent
since 1984 have taken their toll on Indian appropriations.*^
While money earmarked for Indians under these two programs
has been held at a constant, total annual federal spending
has nearly doubled over the same period — from about $530
billion in 1979 to an estimated $1 trillion in 1987.* 4
Indians have felt the budget axe in other federal
agencies, according to Jane Clairmont, the tribal grants and
contracting officer for the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes.*^ The departments of Housing and Urban Development,
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Commerce, and Education once provided a variety of programs
specific for Indians, she says, but they have since
eliminated or sharply reduced Indian programs.
One way Clairmont can measure the impact of federal
budget cuts is to examine how they have affected the federal
government's primary self-determination policy on a
particular reservation. Public law 93-638, the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,
established what's widely referred to as "638" contracting.
Under this law, Indian tribes contract with the federal
government to assume the management of services previously
provided by the federal government. Money comes from the
federal government, but the programs are managed by Indian
governments.
Clairmont oversees the fiscal management for a host
of such programs —among them law enforcement, social
services, education, resource management — now contracted
by the Salish and Kootenai tribal government. In 1981,
tribal government received $16 million for such contracts;
in 1987, the federal government reduced these expenditures
to $10 million.*®
The Salish and Kootenai, with the best Indian
economy in the state, has found other sources of income to
supplement some of these programs. But the Flathead tribes
are an exception rather than a rule.
"Most tribes aren't in a position like we are," she
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says, adding, "Most tribes don't have a thing. What are they
going to do? They are going to be terminated."
In theory, state government is to replace the
federal government -- to help fund social welfare and
educational programs, for example. But the state cannot, due
to its own limited funds and because of a quagmire of
jurisdictional problems.
It's not easy for the white society to understand
the Indians' problems. But to start with, Montana's Native
Americans ask that the larger society first recognize how
things have become as they are. Fort Belknap tribal leader
and BIA official Jack Plumage says, "The quote-unquote
Indian problem is a non-Indian problem, because Indians have
had no input in determining their own destiny."*^ This view
holds that Indians today are merely a product of the system
under which they have lived — a system which has allowed
the federal government to make their decisions for them,
and, thereby, to cripple self-determination and cultural
viability.
John Mohawk, an Indian writer who has written
extensively about natural resource development on
reservations, blames the current situation on what he calls
"the reservation experience."*® In a presentation at
Humboldt State University in June 1986, Mohawk said: "The
reservation experience has taught us that we are not capable
of thinking for ourselves."
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Montana's Indians also ask that society look at each
reservation separately: as homelands for ethnically distinct
people and governments. Each reservation is different, they
say, with highly variable historical and cultural roots and
sharply contrasting land and natural resource bases.
For example, Montana's seven reservations represent
at least 10 tribes, arriving in the state at different times
and under different circumstances. Some of the tribes were
allies; some were bitter enemies. In addition, these tribes
also have unique relationships with the federal government,
due to the varying conditions under which their reservations
were established. Resource bases are also varied. The
Blackfeet, Fort Peck, Crow, Northern Cheyenne, and Flathead
reservations have significant natural resource bases, while
the Rocky Boy's and Fort Belknap reservations are resourcepoor. Yet, even those reservations with resources have been
unable to convert them into viable economic assets.
Despite the many variables, there are certain
problems, certain impediments to economic viability, that
occur on nearly all reservations. Many of those problems
were identified in 1984 in the controversial Report and
Recommendations to the President of the United States by a
special presidential commission.*^ In general terms, the
problems are:
— Lack of money. It takes money to make money. Most
tribes have little or no savings and a very limited ability

to raise income. Rocky Boy's Reservation, where annual
tribal revenues are less than $300,000, is perhaps the
poorest reservation in Montana, but it is not that atypical.
The view from there is voiced by Rocky Boy's BIA
Superintendent Karole Overberg, who says: "With no money in
the bank you can dream, but you can't get anything
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started.
Indian leaders recognize that the so-called "easy
money" days of President Lyndon Johnson's 1960s Great
Society are over, and they find themselves competing with
other tribes and non-Indian governments for dwindling
federal grants and loans. They also say that, while Great
Society dollars may have funded industrial parks and
housing, those projects were applied broadly over all
reservations and did not meet the highly variable needs or
economic realities of specific reservations. As a result,
many, like a carpet factory at Crow Agency, or an industrial
park in Browning, have generally failed.
Today, the money that most Indian governments can
raise, commonly through resource development or land
leasing, is used to pay for basic social programs and the
cost of running their own governments. Tribal governments
have grown in size and function as tribes take on increasing
responsibility from the federal government through 638
contracting. Pressure from the federal government, in the
form of decreased financial support, only serves to
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encourage rapid resource exploitation rather than long-term
resource planning.
Further, while the 638 process has accelerated the
switch to tribal control, it has simultaneously crippled the
Indians' ability to act. According to Blackfeet tribal
Treasurer Elouise Cobell, tribal governments have found that
after taking over management of a service, a service
previously funded by the federal government (and still may
be considered a trust responsibility), the federal
government will likely reduce its financial support for that
service. 2 * Tribal government is then left with the financial
burden of funding the program or facing the political wrath
of tribal members when services decline, she says. The
result, Cobell says, is that tribal governments are
questioning why they should drain their bank accounts and
shoulder the cost of programs that they believe are trust
responsibilities of the federal government. The incentive of
self sufficiency turns then to leaving as much
responsibility with the federal government as possible.
Billings-Area BIA Director Richard Whitesell admits that the
"638" process isn't working and that it should be re
evaluated. 2 2
— Lack of human resources. While Indian
reservations, with high unemployment, have a large pool of
workers, too many of the people do not have the needed
vocational training or educational background in such fields
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as business, natural resource management, and law."

*
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What's worse, though, is that those Indians who do
leave their reservation for vocational or academic pursuits
are often shunned by their own people upon their return.
Crow tribal Planner Leonard Bends remembers returning from
Eastern Montana College in Billings to his reservation
several years ago and being challenged by tribal elders. 2 4
He says the elders told him he didn't belong on the
reservation anymore, that somehow he had been tainted by the
white man's education. But that's not the only reason he was
told to leave. College-educated Indians can find work off
the reservation, he was told, so tribal government jobs —
positions which represent just about the only work available
on a reservation — should go to the non-educated Indians
because they can't find work off the reservation.
— Attitude and morale problems. Depressed economic^
conditions on reservations can lead to despair and can fuel
a cycle of poverty, tribal leaders say. In addition, many
Indians who begin to do well in business are shunned by
fellow tribal members if they succeed. Blackfeet attorney
Joe McKay, former tribal business councilman and president
of the Blackfeet Indian Writing Co., calls this phenomenon

J s It is common to most reservations, and

"Indian jealously."

it discourages Indians from becoming entrepreneurs, McKay
says. The problem involves the "keeping up with the Jones'
theory," he says. In non-Indian society, when people see
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their neighbors doing well, they want to do well also.
Success breeds success and becomes a motivational force
behind the overall improvement of the standard of living in
a community. But in Indian country, McKay says, a successful
member of the tribe will face jealousy and antagonism.
— Tribal politics. "Investors don't want to touch
us with a 10-foot pole we're so damn unstable," says
Northern Cheyenne leader Joe Little Coyote. 2 ® The Northern
Cheyenne have had three tribal presidents in the past two
years. Two have been thrown out of office: one was impeached
by the tribe, the other by the tribal council. The problem
of political instability is by no means limited to the
Northern Cheyenne. Economic development specialists on all
Montana reservations, with the exception of those at Fort
Peck, acknowledge that their governments have been unstable,
or, at best, unable to maintain consistency in their
decisions.
The BIA's Richard Whitesell says Indian leaders
should be elected based on qualifications and not, as is
often the case, on how large a block of relatives the
candidate can assemble. In-fighting, political corruption,
and rapid turnover on tribal councils makes long-term
planning nearly impossible, he says.
— Poor business management. The President's
Commission on Indian Reservation Economies ranked this as
the top tribal problem. Tribal officials from various Indian
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planning offices around the state concur, saying that many
Indian leaders lack the business skills needed to function
effectively in the modern business world. "Management on the
reservations is more scarce than money," says Merle Lucas,
who directs the Montana Inter-tribal Policy Board in
Billings. 2 ^ Non-Indian business leaders find it frustrating
to deal with elected tribal leaders, who often lack the
business savvy found in the outside business world,
? ft

according to the Rocky Boy's grants writer Tom Weist. °
Weist, a non-Indian who has worked on several
reservations, says that tribal politicians will sometimes
show up late for meetings, or leave early, and may quickly
reverse their decisions on short notice. He says many nonIndians who would like to do business on a reservation
become frustrated with tribal business management.
Recognizing these problems, a trend exists in Montana for
tribal planning offices to establish economic development
corporations to carry out day-to-day development activities.
— Jurisdictional problems. Conducting business on a
reservation means compliance with many Indian regulations in
addition to regulations imposed by various agencies within
federal and state governments. Often the distinction between
those jurisdiction is unclear.
— Indian preference in employment. Tribal
governments can set quotas on federally contracted jobs
carried out on reservations. While quotas can ensure Indian
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employment in certain circumstances, quotas are criticized
for causing higher labor costs, especially when there is an
absence of trained workers. Indian preference laws can be
demanding. The Blackfeet Reservation, for example, seeks 95percent Indian employment, a standard that may prevent an
?Q
off-reservation business from coming to the reservation. ^
— The BIA. The BIA, a major Indian employer, is
seen by many as a self-perpetuating bureaucracy that absorbs
federal dollars in administration, leaving a relatively
small percentage of those dollars to Indians. Reluctance on
the part of some BIA personnel to encourage selfdetermination policies is fueled by a fear that such
policies may spell an end to the BIA, and the loss of their
jobs on a reservation where unemployment is already too
high.
Despite these and other problems, Indian leaders in
Montana remain optimistic. They say their people are better
off than 10 years ago, perhaps not financially, but
certainly in terms of education and sophistication. There's
another factor, though, and it involves a change in work
ethics and attitudes that Northern Cheyenne leader Dennis
Limberhand, a Montana Power official at Colstrip, has seen
over the past decade or so. "The work ethic is just catching
on," he says, adding, "our generation is really the first
generation of lunch-packers."-^
Indian leaders agree that progress is painfully
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slow, but Fort Belknap BIA official Jack Plumage points out
that Indians have been in the business of self-government
for just 50 years. It was not until 1934 that Indians were
allowed to practice their existing form of government,
modeled after the dominant society's.
Just as an Indian bumper sticker, in recalling one
of the most famous of Indian battles, says "Custer got
Siouxed," today's Indians are waging their own battles in
courtrooms, often over the control of natural resources.
Indian attorney and activist John Echohawk of the Native
American Rights Fund in Boulder, Colo., says: "Indians have
finally learned the good old American way ... suing
everybody.
"Nobody is going to give us anything. You go to
court and fight for it," he says.^* Indians, with less than
1 percent percent of the country's total population, have
little political clout, Echohawk says. But they have legal
clout stemming from treaties. On the national scene, Indians
have in recent years won some significant victories,
including the $81.5 million settlement by Maine's Penobscot
and Passamaquoddy tribes for lands illegally confiscated 200
years ago and the $122 million settlement by South Dakota's
Lakota Sioux for the white man's illegal acquisition of the
Black Hills a century ago.^ 2 Other tribes have won back
aboriginal hunting and fishing rights.
However, there is another type of battle being won
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by Indians. These battles are much less publicized than
multi-million treaty settlements, yet their impact is
perhaps much longer lasting. They involve a slow but steady
growth in tribal responsibility over their natural
resources, and often, as a result, a growing amount of
control over non-Indians who live within a reservation's
boundaries. The Confederated Salish and Kootenai of the
Flathead Reservation have, for example, won, through court
decisions, the right to control the bed and banks of the
southern shore of Flathead Lake and to require recreational
visitors to carry a permit.
Tribal governments have also been doing their own
business negotiations lately, and they have won better
payments for their resources than in the past, when the
less-profit-minded BIA did the negotiations. The Blackfeet
and Fort Peck tribes have taken advantage of a 1982 law that
allows tribal governments the authority to enter into joint
ventures with resource development companies. Instead of a
flat percentage of the profits, these tribal governments
have made deals to allow them to share equally from profits
on oil and gas wells. In addition, Assiniboine and Sioux at
Fort Peck were the second Indians in the nation to drill
their own oil well — a risky venture that has brought in
$500,000 so far. 3 3
The Fort Peck tribes have converted their natural
resource revenue into an industrial concern that is among
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the largest in the state. A&S Industries in Poplar employs
up to 500 people. It manufactures netting and aluminum
medical chests for the U.S. military. And the Blackfeet are
using money from their recent joint venture with ARCO to re
establish a bank on the reservation.
Montana Power's Colstrip projects have employed
scores of Northern Cheyenne after the Northern Cheyenne
declared their neighboring reservation a pristine, Class I
airshed. Based on that classification, the Northern Cheyenne
negotiated a settlement allowing Colstrip coal development
to continue, but only under conditions that were favorable
to the Northern Cheyenne. Meanwhile, the Crow maintain the
state's only Indian coal mine, an open-pit development that
has generated more than $28 million in royalties for the
tribe since 1974."^
The Salish and Kootenai, who acknowledge that they
are among the most blessed Indians in terms of their
abundance of renewable resources, have taken an aggressive
position to ensure water quality and the natural beauty of
Flathead Lake, one of their most important natural
resources. They have also recently negotiated a lucrative
contract with Montana Power over the operation of the 180megawatt Kerr Dam on the Flathead River. Montana Power,
which had paid a rent of less than $1 million for most of
the dam's first 50 years, will pay the Salish and Kootenai
$9 million per year — adjusted to inflation — for the next
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30 years and will then turn the dam over to the tribes.
The position that the Salish and Kootenai are in now
allows former Flathead Tribal Vice-Chairman Ron Therriault
to dismiss assertions that economic development has to be
defined in terms of resource exploitation.^
"People say that if you do these things
(environmental protection) you can't grow," he says. "Well
maybe you can't grow as an industrial power, but we don't
necessarily want to grow as an industrial power."
In all the above cases, tribal governments find
themselves trying to make the best out of their own
particular situation. And while it is easy to write a story
of despair, focusing on the poverty and disease, it's clear
that a number of Indian leaders are indeed trying to solve
their many problems.
According to the policy board's Merle Lucas, the
most promising trend has been a shift in tribal leaders from
older and less educated to a new generation of younger, more
educated Indians. He says he believes that this trend must
continue, because reservations cannot stay isolated from the
outside world forever. If tribal leaders are not prepared to
change, they are going to get "lost in the shuffle," Lucas
says.
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PART ONE

EASTERN MONTANA'S INDIAN RESERVATIONS

CHAPTER ONE

THE BLACKFEET INDIAN RESERVATION

Poverty and Potential;
A Land of Contrasts

Tucked against the grandeur of Glacier National
Park, an attraction to more than 2 million visitors a year,
the people of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation live in
relative isolation where the wind-blown Northern Great
Plains abruptly meet the ice-carved peaks of the Rocky
Mountains.
This is a relatively rich and diverse land, a 1.5million-acre portion of northern Montana ranging in
elevation from 9,000 feet near Glacier Park to 3,400 feet on
the reservation's eastern boundary. Its natural resources
include oil and gas (accounting for about 60 percent of the
tribe's revenue), water, coal, and a land base that tribal
planners believe could support farming, ranching, and
commercial hunting and fishing — all at the same time.^
However, the economic reality to the approximately
5,500 tribal members who live on the reservation reads like
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that of many other Indian reservations: capital is in short
supply, as are people trained or educated in modern
technology. The tribe must also deal with a confusing array
of local, state, federal, and Indian bureaucracies.
Officially, the Billings-Area Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) office estimates tribal unemployment at 36
But tribal leaders say 80 percent is closer to the

percent.

truth, and local BIA officials will agree.^ More than half
the Blackfeet population lives in poverty.^ Alcoholism and
other health problems are prevalent, and a tragic number of
young tribal members die in traffic accidents, often after
drinking.
Declining tribal revenues from oil and gas, along
with a depressed agricultural market, and the federal
government budget squeeze, all combine to make economic
development — specifically, the creation of Indian jobs —
a necessity of tribal government.^
Blackfeet treasurer Elouise Cobell says tribal
revenues (what the tribe can raise from oil and gas leases
and rangeland or farmland leases, for example) dropped from
$6 million in 1985 to under $4 million in 1986. In addition,
she says federal aid dropped $1 million in 1986 to about $6
million.^ She says tribal leaders, who manage the affairs of
a government serving the needs of the state's largest Indian
tribe (about 12,700, the majority of whom live off the
reservation), expect the trend to continue.
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Another problem has been the lack of a bank on the
reservation. The First National Bank of Browning closed in
late 1983 due to poor management practices.

O

Since that

time, reservation residents have had to travel to Cut Bank,
a 70-mile round trip, for the nearest banking services.
As the Great FalIs Tribune reported at the time of
the closure, the sudden loss of a financial institution,
with assets of $13.3 million, placed a significant burden on
local businesses, consumers, and the already stressed local
economy. "Approximately 150 people — businessmen, ranchers,
farmers and Blackfeet tribal members — agreed the problem
is simple enough. Without a bank, there is no mechanism to
cash the nearly $800,000 a week in payroll checks," the
Tribune's Browning correspondent John Barber wrote after
Q
attending a community meeting. He added, "Merchants are
afraid that if residents leave the reservation to cash their
checks, they might also buy their consumer goods out of
town."
Merchants' fears apparently came true. According to
Blackfeet Reservation BIA Superintendent William Gipp, the
flow of money off the reservation since 1983 to banking
institutions and retail outlets in regional centers like Cut
Bank, Great Falls, and Kalispell has been crippling. 1 ®
Meanwhile, a new bank is scheduled to open in 1987.
At the outset, it will be 75 percent tribally owned and 25
percent owned by non-Indian investors. Tribal government has
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planned to sell all but 20 percent of its shares within five
years, with a goal of keeping volatile tribal politics out
of the bank's management. Nevertheless, the new bank will
likely inherit a problem reported at the time of the former
bank's closure: an inconsistent and political tribal court
that prevented the bank from collecting on bad loans in
cases where tribal court had jurisdiction.
Securing a new bank was one of several goals
outlined in the reservation's five-year economic development
program begun in April 1984. Other goals, such as creating
500 new jobs on the reservation, are proving allusive. One
key problem, according to University of Montana Native
American Studies Director Ken Pepion, is a lack of skilled
workers and educated leaders.^ Recognizing his bias toward
formal education, Pepion, a Blackfeet tribal member, says he
doubts whether his tribe has the human resources needed to
bring about an economic turnaround given the climate of
federal budget cuts and economic recession. Like many of
Montana's Indians, Pepion says he believes federal Indian
policy has become an insidious form of economic termination
disguised in the morally lofty language of self-sufficiency.
Tribal members need to learn basic job skills, as
well as gain knowledge in business, natural resource
management, and law, Pepion says. But like on other Montana
reservations, education — the kind offered off a
reservation in "white man's" schools — is not widely
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accepted by tribal members, says 33-year-old Blackfeet
tribal member Joe McKay.^ McKay, with his law degree from
the University of Montana, represents a new generation of
Indian leaders. Speaking from personal experience, McKay
says tribal members who leave home for college return with
new ideas that are perceived as a threat to Indians who do
not have that education.
McKay also criticizes Indians who say that their
traditional values of sharing wealth and taking care of the
land cannot mesh with the larger, white, so-called
"capitalistic" society. The Blackfeet, like tribes across
the country, are enjoying a cultural rebirth, and many
Indians question whether today's Native Americans can become
good entrepreneurs in a system they believe is based on
greed. McKay rejects these criticisms by saying that
business owners can follow their native traditions, so long
as they take care of business first. Native culture can
remain intact, he says, so long as his people understand
that culture also evolves. McKay warns against "living in
the past."
Tribal politics, which typically lead to a nearcomplete turnover on the tribal business council every two
years, are called "cutthroat" and "counterproductive" by
Pepion. Planning efforts are often redirected when the
council changes, and credibility is damaged by occasional
political acts of favoritism by certain tribal leaders.

25

Pepion says the traditional Blackfeet way is for an elder to
take care of his own family. Nepotism is not always
recognized as wrong, he says, even though the federal
government considers it illegal.
Despite economic, social, and political gloom, there
remains a spirit of optimism on the Blackfeet Reservation,
thanks in part to the reservation's natural resource base,
its potential for tourism and recreation, and the recent
accreditation and tribal support for the Blackfeet Community
College. Tribal leaders say that seeing 67 students graduate
from the college in 1986 — during its first year of
accreditation — is a sign that the reservation is moving in
the right direction.
The Blackfeet "have got a handle on what they need
to do, as opposed to just throwing up their hands," and they
are actively striving for self sufficiency, says the BIA's
Gipp. His optimism is shared by McKay, an ex-tribal
councilman who used his legal skills to help negotiate a
multi-million oil and gas contract with ARCO and re
establish the bank in Browning.
"Even though times are tough on the reservation, the
fact that the tribe is still here shows that we are
survivors," says McKay. "We have a lot of optimism here,
because we can see a lot of potential."
McKay now presides over the Blackfeet's only
industry, a pen and pencil manufacturing company that
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employs about 45 tribal members. The tribally owned
Blackfeet Indian Writing Co., a nationally recognized Indian
success story that has floundered this decade, reorganized
in 1984. It is once again showing a profit, according to
plant manager Tom McKay, Joe's brother.^ One reason for the
turn-around, Tom McKay says, is that tribal government
recognizes that efficiency, even at the expense of some
tribal jobs, is essential for the enterprise to survive. The
plant, which used to employ about twice as many tribal
members, is now producing more pens and pencils with half
the number of employees, according to McKay.
The ARCO deal, made possible through 1982 federal
legislation that gave tribes more control over their natural
resources, places the Blackfeet in a position to share
equally in ARCO's future profits should the oil company find
a significant petroleum field. The deal also provided more
than $1 million in up-front bonus payments, as well as
specific provisions for Indian employment and college
scholarships.
Like many other organizations or agencies in
Montana, the Blackfeet are looking at tourism and related
recreational industries as a potential economic building
block. However, one of the first steps toward reaching that
goal will be to clean up the town of Browning, home to about
1,100 Indians and 125 whites. 1 5
At Browning City Hall, first-year mayor Julene
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Pepion Kennerly, the nation's first Indian woman mayor, has
hired a young, educated staff of tribal members who have
begun to implement a plan for turning around the area's
economy. The focal point of their plan is to change
Browning's image, and to dispell the attitude of defeatism
she and others say has plagued the community. 1 ^
Town Planner Wayne Juneau sees Browning's role as a
catalyst for economic development on the reservation. 1 ^
Governments — city, county, state, federal and tribal

—

have "fought like cats and dogs" over the years, he says,
and these jurisdictional problems have had a "chilling
effect" on accomplishing economic development goals.
However, he points to the accomplishments of Kennerly in her
first year, and predicts "a warming trend."
According to Kennerly, city government has achieved
the following since she took office in January 1986:
— Glacier County commissioners, who normally meet
in the county seat of Cut Bank located off the reservation,
held a meeting with Indians in Browning.
— An organizational summit meeting of officials
from Toole, Flathead, Glacier and Pondera counties was held
to prepare for the anticipated 13 million vehicles that are
expected to pass through these counties on their way to the
1988 Winter Olympics at Calgary, Alta.
— A Browning beautification program has been
launched. Junk cars are being removed, a street sweeper
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cleans streets once a week, and more than 1,000 trees were
planted.
The beautification program is aimed at getting more
of the tens of thousands of tourists who pass through
Browning each year on U.S. Highway 2 to stop and shop, eat a
meal, or spend a night before they go on to Glacier Park,
which is just 15 miles west. However, motels and restaurants
are few. And many of the town's buildings — including
motels, restaurants, and gas stations — are run down. Many
have broken and boarded-up windows. Most are adorned with
graffiti. The same picture of poverty is also painted on the
town's government housing, public buildings, and schools.
Joe McKay admits that, esthetically, Browning
doesn't "have a lot to look at."
That's also the view of Lewistown architect Jeff
Shelden, who, last year, completed a Browning Redevelopment
Plan for the city. Shelden, who interviewed a number of the
town's business people, most of whom are white, wrote: "most
merchants realize that Browning does attract attention, but
in a negative fashion. . . ."i® He reported that the run
down and dirty appearance of Browning helps perpetuate long
standing preconceptions that many whites have toward
Indians.
Sheldon noted a sharp contrast between the
spectacular beauty of the reservation's western boundary and
the bleak appearance of Browning: "The city is easily
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perceived as a blight on a landscape unparalleled in
America. Many of the amenities found on the reservation
disappear in the heart of the city. Traditionalists speak of
reverence for the land, yet junk cars, litter, and debris
pile up on top of it thoughout the city. How long the
Blackfeet can live with this disparity is only a matter of
time."
Despite its current appearance, Browning can,
however, fit into long-range tourism and recreational
development plans. One logical idea calls for the city of
Browning, after a clean-up effort, to be the place where
Indian culture is stressed, while scenic and recreational
resources are emphasized along the mountains and near the
park.
In 1985 and 1986, the tribe seemed to be heading in
both directions, by making efforts to clean up Browning and
by purchasing the KOA campgrounds franchise for Glacier
County and operating two campgrounds near Glacier Park. In
the case of the campgrounds, KOA will provide management
expertise that was lacking in a previous efforts to run a
campground, tribal leaders hope.
Tribal planner Ed Aubert says there has been some
interest by tribal leaders in developing a ski resort along
the border of Glacier Park at Divide Mountain. But Aubert
acknowledged that the ski area would cost up to $50 million
and would be a risky venture given the reservation's remote
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location. The only way he believes such a venture would be
feasible is if it were developed in stages.
Aubert warns, though, that the tribe may not be
willing to accept tourism on a large scale. He says a
significant number of Indians don't want more whites to
visit or live on the reservation. Tourism would have to be
promoted in a tactful manner, he says, adding that it would
have to be acceptable to the majority of tribal members. The
Missoula-based Institute of the Rockies, together with the
tribal tourism project, is encouraging a regionally
coordinated culturally and environmentally sensitive form of
tourism.
Obviously, the St. Mary and Babb areas along Highway
89, which offer perhaps the most spectacular Rocky Mountain
Front scenery between the Canadian and Mexican borders, will
play a essential role in any developing tourism industry.
Glacier-fed streams and lakes extend from the park into an
area of great ecological diversity typically found in the
plains-to-mountains transition, giving the Blackfeet prime
hunting and fishing potential. McKay points to studies by
the federal govenment which list the Blackfeet reservation
sixth nationally in miles of fishing streams, and fifth in
the number and size of lakes that could be managed for
fishing.
A potential is seen for commercial hunting. As it
stands now, non-Indians can purchase tribal permits for
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fishing, but hunting by non-members is prohibited on the
reservation. As a result, McKay and Aubert recognize that
commercial hunting — hunting which would require tribal
members sharing that resource with outsiders and would nodoubt irritate certain traditionalists — would be
controversial.
However, other tribes, particularly in the
southwest, have done well by offering guided big-game
hunting services. And some people think the Blackfeet could
do just as well. Due to its proximity to Glacier Park and
the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area, the Blackfeet could offer
hunts for just about all the big-game species that make up
legends of the West: elk, white-tail and mule deer,
antelope, sheep, mountain goats, grizzly bears, and black
bears. A new addition to the hunting experience, the cry of
the wolf, can now be heard as that species is making a slow
recovery in Glacier Park and along the Front. Tribal members
may even be able to exploit a desire by certain tourists who
seek to capture the mystique of the Old West by offering
guided wilderness adventures.
The development of commercial hunting and fishing
would require better management of land, water, and wildlife
resources, McKay and Aubert say. Coordinated efforts with
the several federal and state agencies involved would be
necessary. They say a significant capital investment in land
and resource management would be required, but note that
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tribal government is moving in that direction.
Like other reservations, the Blackfeet are using
their natural resource base to assert what they believe to
be their treaty rights and to pursue their goals of self
determination. One recent issue provides a good example of
the clash between two cultures and various jurisdictions.
This issue revolves around a controversial portion of the
Lewis and Clark National Forest known as the Badger-Two
Medicine. This unit of land has become the focal point of a
battle between the Forest Service and the Blackfeet Indians,
pitting the tribe and a local environmental group (the
Glacier-Two Medicine Alliance and its Missoula-based Badger
Chapter) against the federal government and oil interests,
who see great potential for oil and gas development in the
area.
More than 102,000 acres of the Badger-Two Medicine
are without roads. Because of its proximity to Glacier Park
and its role as habitat for the threatened grizzly bear, the
Badger-Two Medicine is considered to be a prime site for
wilderness designation. Montana's Congressional delegation
has not included this area in previous wilderness bills,
however, because the Blackfeet retain certain limited rights
to the area, rights which would likely be precluded under
wilderness designation.
In late 1986, a group of Blackfeet, with the
endorsement of tribal government, appealed the Lewis and
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Clark National Forest Plan which would allow oil and gas
development in the area.

19
7

Traditionalists claim the area is

spiritual. To develop it, they say, would be comparable to
tearing down a church or temple and would violate their
rights under the First Amendment and the Native American
Religious Freedom Act.
This group of traditionalists say they want the
federal government to turn the land over to the Indians so
they can manage it as a spiritual area. Yet one can't look
at the depth of economic despair on the reservation and
wonder if the traditionalists would be overruled, should the
tribe ever control that land and petroleum was found.
The fate of that appeal has not been determined, and
a lengthy court battle is likely — a battle that has the
potential to divide the tribe between development interests
and religious interests, alienate the Forest Service, and
leave non-Indian environmentalists who back the Blackfeet
traditionalists feeling betrayed. If this indeed is the
scenerio which is ultimately played out on the Badger-Two
Medicine, it would be an example of business as usual on an
Indian reservation. But if the various interests can work
together, the Badger-Two Medicine may provide an excellent
example of how co-management and political compromise can
work to meet the needs of all involved. It certainly has the
potential for such an experiment in cooperation.
Meanwhile, at BIA headquarters in Browning,
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Superintendent Gipp sums up his feelings about the
Blackfeet, and, in fact, all Indians. Gipp says that Indians
just need to ride out today's rough economic times and those
expected in the near future. If today's Indians can hang on
now, he believes they'll have a good chance to eventually
reach their goals of economic self-sufficiency and political
self-determination in the next century.
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CHAPTER TWO

THE FORT PECK INDIAN RESERVATION

Oi1 and Gas, Farming and Industry:
Wide-ranging Tribal Enterprises
of the Assiniboine and Sioux

Northeast Montana's Assiniboine and Sioux tribes are
economic leaders among the state's seven Indian
reservations. Oil, gas, sand and gravel, bentonite, and
water are abundant and still relatively undeveloped on the
2-million acre Fort Peck Indian Reservation, which is
located on rolling plains above the Missouri River.
These two tribes, with a combined enrollment of
8,500 and a resident population of about 4,500, have been
successful in working together to develop their oil and gas
reserves. They are the only tribes to negotiate a water
rights pact with the state, and they have turned money
derived from their natural resources into a relatively
diversified tribal economy.
Bureau of Indian Affairs Superintendent Dennis
Whiteman describes Fort Peck tribal leaders as
"progressive." 1 He says they've done well because they don't
wait to see how tribal leaders at other reservations do
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things. In fact, the Fort Peck tribes are cited by other
eastern Montana reservations as a role model. Whiteman
praises Fort Peck Indians for looking to management
expertise off the reservation when needed.
The Fort Peck tribes have accomplished something
unique in Montana's Indian country: they've developd a major
industrial sector of their economy. A&S (Assiniboine and
Sioux) Tribal Industries, the envy of other Montana tribes,
especially those along the Hi-Line, employs more than 450
people — 75 percent of whom are Indian. The plant turns
sheet aluminum into military medical chests and bulk rolls
of netting into custom camouflage.

It has become one of the

largest manufacturing firms in Montana.
A&S Industries is tribally owned but is managed by
an outside firm, the Brunswick Corp., which produces a
diversified line of products from sporting goods to military
hardware. Most of the work at A&S Industries is done by
hand, which allows the tribes to hire many people, according
to A&S Program Manager Daryl Boyd. Assembly of the medical
chests requires up to 147 steps, and the netting requires
meticulous squaring, cutting, sewing, and inspection.
By capitalizing on military contracts, and by
seeking minority tax and business advantages, A&S Industries
has shown steady growth since it began operations 11 years
ago. This success leads tribal Chairman Kenneth Ryan to
boast: "We have a very significant economic impact on this
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area." 3
A&S Industries has, for example, generated more than
than $90 million in sales, including more than $22 million
in 1985; growth is predicted through at least 1989.^ It has
expanded from 160 employees in 1975 to a peak of 499
employees in 1985.^ And the company paid more than $6.3
million in wages in 1985.^ Since non-Indian make up about
one-fourth of the labor force, Ryan says the plant helps to
ease racial tensions in the community and shows tribal
government's interest in being a good neighbor.
The Fort Peck tribes also own a small electronics
firm, West Electronics Inc. It began operating in 1970 under
the name Multiplex, in a joint venture with a New York
company. The tribes purchased Multiplex five years later and
continue to assemble a variety of computer parts at the
Poplar facility. In 1986, West Electronics had contracts to
assemble modems for telecommunications, printed circuit
cards, electronic counters, and a digital caliper sensitive
enough to measure the size difference between two strands of
hair.^ The company, with a dozen employees, also took on its
first in-state contract in 1986: a computerized device that
attaches around a cow's neck and counts the number of times
its head goes up and down during feeding. Sales in 1985 were
about $450,000, and 1986 sales were predicted to reach
$750,000. 8
The success of these enterprises has given the
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tribes a good track record, according to tribal planner
Q
Lonnie Reddog.

And Reddog says there's nothing like a good

track record to attract "seed money" for new projects or for
the expansion of existing business ventures. Other tribes in
Montana with poor track records are at a disadvantage when
competing against the Fort Peck tribes for economic
development opportunities such as grants, special loans, or
new business enterprises, he says.
Fort Peck's political stability — atypical of
Montana reservations — has also been a positive factor. A&S
Industries president and tribal executive board member
Norman Hollow, who is credited with leading the tribes into
the modern era, was tribal chairman for 12 years. He retired
from the tribes' top post in October 1985.
Planning efforts have been consistent, also atypical
of Montana reservations. Reddog and chief planner Rodney
Miller, both college educated, have been with tribal
government for a decade, providing steady leadership in the
tribes' planning office. In addition, they are among the few
Indian planners in Montana to praise their elected
leadership, the executive board, for recognizing the need to
develop and follow long-range plans for economic growth.
Also atypical of Montana reservations, these two planners
say that even though there has been considerable turnover on
their executive tribal board, new council members have built
on the work of their predecessors instead of trying
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something new.
The most recent tribal economic development plan,
dated January 1986, looks at the past, present, and future,
with an emphasis on how the Fort Peck tribal government has
fared with its implementation of previous plans.The plan
identifies the tribes' strengths and weaknesses, and it sets
priorities. It is written in a professional manner, and
provides a good profile of tribal economic activity. By
contrast, planning efforts on virtually all other Montana
reservations — with the exception of the Flathead Indian
Reservation — are considered inadequate by BIA officials or
tribal leaders who specialize in economic development.^
Miller says that Fort Peck is where it is at today
because it was able to build on money made available during
President Lyndon Johnson's Great Society days of the 1960s.
During that time, the tribal government decided that it
could not make it on farming and ranching alone, and decided
to diversify, he says.
By building on foundations identified in a 1970 BIA
report which assessed the Fort Peck's economic potential,
1 y
they followed a plan based on their unique circumstances. *
That report recognized that Fort Peck is relatively isolated
from large population, manufacturing, or marketing centers.
Yet it identified a natural resource base that was diverse
and rich: energy resources, water, hunting, fishing, and
boating. For people who don't mind living in rural areas or
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on the Great Plains, the Fort Peck Reservation was
identified as a place where quality of life could be high.
Highlights from that report include the following:
— The nearby Fort Peck Reservoir and Missouri River
could be a major regional recreation destination for
camping, hunting, fishing, and boating. 1 3
— Water is abundant, thanks to the Missouri River
and the nearby Fort Peck reservoir, which has a storage
capacity of about 14 million acre feet. 1 4
— Fossil fuel reserves were described as "huge." 1 5
More than 14 billion tons of coal are estimated to underlie
the reservation. 1 ^ The reservation is located within the
oil-rich Williston Basin, which includes most of North
Dakota, part of South Dakota, and part of Manitoba. 1 ^ The
center of this oil-producing region is in McKenzie County
North Dakota, about 40 miles southeast of the reservation.
— Significant reserves of bentonite, clay, salt,
sand and gravel, and potash are also within the
reservation. 1 8
Sixteen years after the 1970 report, most of those
resources remain undeveloped, but the tribes have turned
profits from an expanding oil and gas industry into an
economy that features a strong manufacturing element. And
tribal efforts at environmental protection — air and water
quality management, for example — protect the area's
potential as a recreational center and enhance the quality
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of life. Like the Northern Cheyenne and Flathead
reservations, Fort Peck's airshed has been designated Class
I, the highest possible under federal law.
Coal, the reservation's most abundant energy
resource, remains undeveloped and provides the potential for
long-term economic security, depending on future technology
and market conditions. As was predicted in 1970, "If total
development is ever undertaken, Roosevelt County (the
majority of which is within the reservation) could possibly
rank among the nation's most important coal producers." 1 ^
Even though there has been no coal development to
date, oil and gas resources have become a leading source of
tribal revenue. However, the tribes have learned from
recent, first-hand experience that the erratic nature of the
energy business can bring a bust just as easily as a boom.
A&S tribal Oil and Gas Department Director Ann Lambert says
that the tribes have been getting about 60 percent less for
each barrel of oil sold than they were able to get a couple
years ago.

on

And she says total revenues from oil and gas,

including lease payments, were expected to drop by half
between 19 85 and 19 86.^
Tribal officials are reluctant to discuss specific
details about this budget crunch, but it has clearly been a
cause of concern. The reservation newspaper reported in July
1986 that the Fort Peck budget in 1985 had been $8.5
million, but dropped to $6.4 million in 1986.^ The 1987
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tribal budget was expected to be about $3.9 million, the
paper reported, while Ryan said the budget for 1987 could be
as low as $3 million. 2 3 As a result, officials have imposed
a 22 percent reduction in all tribal programs, travel
moratoriums on tribal employees, a four-day work week, and
salary reductions. Federal budget cuts were complicating
matters.
Nevertheless, both Ryan and Lambert speak proudly of
their oil and gas ventures. They both like to point to two
significant ventures relating to tribal energy development,
ventures that have dramatically increased the amount of
money the Fort Peck tribes make from their energy reserves,
as well as their say over how those resources will be
developed. They are:
— A joint venture with U.S. Energy, a Wyoming firm,
which places tribal government in a partnership for
petroleum exploration and extraction on the reservation. The
joint venture, made possible by the 1982 Indian Mineral
Leasing and Development Act, will provide the tribes with a
55 percent royalty once U.S. Energy recovers exploration
costs. 2 4 Seven wells have been drilled under this joint
venture. Five have become producers, and the tribes have
generated more than $3 million in profits from these wells,
Lambert says.
— "Winona No. 1," which means first-born girl in
Sioux language, is the name of the first 100 percent
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tribally owned well on the reservation. It was planned,
financed, and drilled entirely by the tribes, which hired
outside expertise on a consulting basis. Developed in 1984,
this is only the second all-Indian-owned well in the
country. It was a gamble, Lambert says, but one that has so
far paid off by bringing in more than $500,000 in revenue
through mid-1986.
The royalty rates, 55 percent and 100 percent
respectively, from these two tribal ventures are
significantly higher than rates negotiated by the BIA prior
to the 1982 law. Billings-based geologist Rick Stefanic says
that the BIA used to treat Indian land much the same way it
treated federal lands, usually by allowing development for a
flat royalty rate of 12.5 percent.

OC
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But under the new law,

Indian tribes, who now are taking a much more active role in
resource development negotiations, have much more latitude
to do what they want, Stefanic says.
John Echohawk, attorney and executive director of
the Native American Rights Fund in Boulder, Colo., explains:
"The BIA used to walk into a council meeting and say,
'Here's an opportunity to make money. Sign here.' And we
n f.
would sign blindly."^ 0
In Montana, the Blackfeet are the only other Indian
tribe to take advantage of the 1982 law. Yet the law is
being welcomed by all reservations with resources, and
tribal leaders across Montana say they will be following the
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lead of Fort Peck and the Blackfeet in the development of
their oil, gas, or coal. The Council of Energy Resource
Tribes (CERT), a national Indian organization made up of
tribes with energy resources, provides a continued lobbying
effort in Washington, D.C., as well as technical assistance
to Indian governments seeking to profit from their
resources.
While the overall economic growth of the Fort Peck
tribes has been impressive, they nevertheless face problems
which threaten to ultimately destroy their very existence.
Unemployment, at about 40 percent, is still too high for
tribal leaders, and so is the tribes' poverty rate of about
35 percent.

?7

White settlement, allowed by the Dawes Act,

has broken up tribal land and resource holdings and has
resulted in a confusing checkerboard ownership. In addition,
Indians have become a minority within their own reservation.
The Fort Peck tribes control only 45 percent of their
reservation's land area, and are outnumbered by whites by
about 4,500 to 5,500. 2 8
Tribal chairman Ryan says that his greatest concern
is for the youth of the tribes, as the Fort Peck Reservation
moves into its second century of existence, and as its
people face the complexities of the 21st century.

9Q

More

than half of Assiniboine and Sioux children never make it
through school, and, Ryan says, "If anything is going to do
us in, that's it." 3 ®
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Formal education is essential for the survival of
his people, he says. He recognizes that the next generation
of Fort Peck Indians needs to build on the accomplishments
of the 1970s and 1980s. The trick, he says, is to educate
young people in all of the basics — math, science, reading
— so that they can go on to college or vocational schools
and learn the essential professional and technical tools
necessary for continued economic growth, while at the same
time making sure that educational programs emphasize their
unique Assiniboine and Sioux heritage.
"We do not wear buckskins; we do not live in skin
dwellings; we are not nomads anymore," he says. "But we are
still Assiniboine people, and we are still Sioux people."
And should these identies ever disappear, he says his people
would become nothing more than another brown-skinned
minority in the melting pot of America.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE ROCKY BOY'S INDIAN RESERVATION

Living with a Smal1 Land Base
and Facing Big Obstacles

The Chippewa-Cree on northcentral Montana's Rocky
Boy's Indian Reservation wish to be financially selfsufficient but are finding it difficult to overcome poverty
on their own.
The view from here, according to tribal water rights
specialist Daryl Wright, is that "the government fed us like
a baby for 100 years, and now they're taking the bottle away
— and we don't like it." 1
The spectre of federal budget cuts is not alone in
casting a shadow over the economic hopes of the 3,300-member
Chippewa-Cree Tribe? natural resources on this 108,000-acre
reservation, the smallest in Montana, have been dropping in
value this decade. Oil, gas, and timber markets have seen a
general recession since the late 1970s, and agriculture —
the economic basis of this part of Montana, called the
Golden Triangle for its wheat production — suffered from
several years of local drought in addition to a national
economic decline.
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While reservations such as the Blackfeet, Flathead,
Fort Peck, and Crow bring in millions of dollars annually
from the sale, rent, or leasing of their natural resources,
the Chippewa-Cree's annual revenue totaled $300,000 in 1985
and was expected to drop to $200,000 by 1987. 2 This makes
the Chippewa-Cree perhaps the poorest of Montana's Indian
tribes and virtually 100 percent dependent upon the federal
government.
Rocky Boy's problems are aggravated by a burgeoning
population, which has more than doubled in 25 years. 3 Much
of the growth has come in the past 10 years, as families
returned to their reservation from urban centers to which
they had moved under the federal government's Indian
assimilation and relocation policies of the 1950s and early
1960s. 4
Tribal member Leon Gardipee provides a good example
of these policies. 5 He's like many Indians in Montana and
across the nation. After living away from his reservation
homeland for most of his life, he's back. Gardipee was born
on the Rocky Boy's in the 1950s. In 1959, as a small child,
his family was moved by the federal government to Los
Angeles, where his father was given a job in a factory.
But there were problems, Gardipee says, because "we
were hicks."
His family never really fit into the urban,
southern California lifestyle. They spoke hardly any
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English, and they longed for their Montana home. Eventually,
they returned to Montana, but not the reservation. Years
later, after living in such places as Helena and Jackson
Hole, Wyo., Gardipee returned as an adult to Rocky Boy's. He
says his reasons were basic: something was missing in his
life, something spiritual.
Like many Indians on other reservations, he's taking
advantage of a new local community college. Gardipee's
studies at Rocky Boy's Stone Child Community College are in
social work, and he's also taking courses on his people's
past. He's studying his roots, which run deep on this
reservation: His great-great-grandfather was Little Bear,
chief of a displaced band of Chippewas. It was Little Bear
who, along with the Cree Band's leader Stone Child (the
white man erroneously translated his name as Rocky Boy) led
the political fight which culminated in the creation of this
reservation at Fort Assiniboine in 1916.^
As other Chippewa-Cree return to the reservation, as
the local recession continues and as federal budget cuts
reduce Indian funding, the economic pressures are likely to
build.
These pressures can be measured in a number of ways.
Among them is the number of people who collect general
assistance (for the poor who don't qualify for other income
programs), which amounts to $78 a month for a single person.
Since 1980, the general assistance rolls have tripled and
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now account for more than $1 million of the approximate $7
million the federal government spends annually on the
reservation. 7
In addition, tribal grants writer Tom Weist, a nontribal member who acts as a consultant to the Chippewa-Cree,
says more than half of the reservation population of about
2,000 live below the federal poverty guidelines.

O

The number

of unemployed tribal members has risen from 405 to 778 since
1980, while the unemployment rate has risen from 58.6
percent to 74.8 percent.

Q

During those same years, the

number of employed has dropped from 308 to 261, echoing the
estimated loss of more than 1,000 jobs in the three-county
region centered around Havre, Chinook, and Big Sandy. 1 ®
The reservation's housing situation is as bleak as
it is for employment and income, according to Kelly
Parisian, who directs the tribal housing program. 1 1 More
than 340 reservation families are on a waiting list for
homes, which means many families are forced to double- or
triple-up with other families, he says.
What homes do exist are often in poor shape, with
many not meeting federal guidelines for safety or
insulation. Of 450 Indian homes surveyed by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Parisian describes 91 as "substandard" and
47 as "totaled." Some of the reservation's homes were
designed for Florida but were purchased cheaply and shipped
to Rocky Boy's back in the early 1960s. 1 2 Parisian says
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those homes have no foundations, their pipes freeze every
winter, and stoves were installed near their only exit,
creating a fire hazard.
From this poverty, the Chippewa-Cree are faced with
the task of lifting themselves through education of their
people, development of their limited natural resource base,
or attracting an industrial facility. All three approaches
require money. But with no big-money resource such as coal,
oil, gas, or hydroelectric power, tribal leaders like Peggy
Nagel, president of the community college, say developing
the minds of the Chippewa-Cree is paramount to economic
LJ
success.•13

"That's all we have left," says Nagel. "We have to
develop our human resources."
Education here has followed the same pattern as on
other Montana reservations. All seven in Montana can boast
to having a community college. In general, community college
programs are tied into specific needs of the tribe. Nagel
points to coursework in farming and ranching, vocational
education, and social work. In addition, students are
required to take courses which teach tribal history,
culture, and language.
The reservation's isolation — a problem not only
for Montana Indian reservations, but one faced by the entire
state — is considered to be a major impediment to
attracting industry. Rocky Boy's is 35 miles south of U.S.
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Highway 2, the nearest major highway, and about 100 miles
from Great Falls, the regional center for this part of
Montana. "When you come out to Rocky Boy's, you come to
Rocky Boy's because you want to," says Bureau of Indian
Affairs Superintendent Karole Overberg.
But all is not entirely grim. For example, the
reservation's housing shortage could help ensure the success
of a tribal forestry and log-home business. And a tribal
propane distribution company is turning a profit while
helping to keep the costs of propane down. More than
anything else, though, the success of the propane company
has shown tribal members that they can do something that
makes money, Weist says.
There's also the potential for small-scale natural
resource development, although it is unclear just what
exploitable resources the tribe has, and whether they can be
developed commercially.
Rocky Boy's timber reserves from a 16,000 acre
commercial forest have been well documented, and these
reports are available to the public. 1 4 However, reports by
the federal government discussing the relative availability
of water, oil, gas, coal, and strategic mineral resources
are held closely by the tribe and the BIA. 1 5 Tribal and BIA
officials don't want these reports made public to avoid
jeopardizing the Chippewa-Cree in future negotiations with
potential developers. 1 ® Other studies by the Council of

57

Energy Resource Tribes (CERT) are also under way and should
help the tribe determine its various options.
Chippewa-Cree Development Project Director Ron Swan,
natural resource manager for the tribe, says that these
reports should help his people take advantage of the Indian
Mineral Leasing and Development Act of 1982. This Act, used
in Montana on the Blackfeet and Fort Peck reservations with
oil companies, allows tribes to enter into an equal
partnership in resource development and provides the
potential for a far greater economic return than before the
1982 law.
However, Swan acknowledges that the Chippewa-Cree
are conservative when it comes to natural resource
development. He is not sure how much natural resource
development tribal members will allow. It has been several
years since the last timber sale, a clearcut that left scars
on the land and a sour taste in the mouths of many tribal
members. In addition, a small ski resort 30 miles south of
Havre has been the target of vandals who opposed the
17

commercialization of the area.

Daryl Wright says he speaks for many of his fellow
tribal members when he objects to mounting pressure — in
the form of budget cuts — on the Chippewa-Cree to develop
their resources. According to Wright, the government is
telling Indians, "If you have gold, sell it; if you have
oil, sell it; if you've got timber, sell it," all without
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regard to future generations.
While there are traditional and cultural elements
opposed to resource exploitation on all Montana
reservations, Rocky Boy's isolation, near-100 percent Indian
population, and small size combine to form a community
attitude that will likely constrain resource development.
The small size of the reservation is a key factor. Rocky
Boy's is too small to hide the scars of a strip mine, for
example, and it would be hard to define a natural resource
sacrifice area because the population is scattered
1 ft

throughout the reservation's hills and valleys. °
But Swan says some development will be possible,
starting with the reservation's 16,000 acres of commercial
forest. The annual allowable cut, identified in the tribal
forest management plan at 5 million board feet, could bring
in as much as $125,000 a year, he says.
Meanwhile, tribal planner Ronnie Joe Henry and his
staff are assessing the possibilities of several business
development opportunities.

1 Q

They include:

— Agriculture. About 50 tribal members graze about
3,000 head of cattle on the reservation, and there are about
10 Indian farmers. 2 ® Tribal government also operates a
4,500-acre wheat and barley farm at Box Elder, but officials
say it has not turned a profit in recent years.
Over the long run, BIA Superintendent Overberg says
agriculture may be the tribe's best economic bet, especially

59

if a Missouri-to-Milk River diversion project is approved.
That project would cross the reservation near the tribal
farm, and could irrigate up to 8,000 reservation acres,
tripling crop yields and raising up to $1 million annually.
— A tribal log home industry. The tribe hopes that
such an industry would be designed to provide log homes to
Indians on the reservation and others in nearby communities.
Planners say log homes are cheaper to build, warmer in the
winter, and cooler in the summer. A full-time researcher has
been commissioned to study the possibilities.

?1

— An ethanol/feedlot project. A consultant is
studying whether local grain can be used to make ethanol and
various by-products. Planners say the future of ethanol
looks promising, partly because the reservation is located
in the heart of farm country. * They see one of the
ethanol's by-products, high-protein mash or mash pellots, as
having the potential for supplying a feedlot in conjuction
with the tribal farm.
— An industrial park at Box Elder. In 1982, the
tribe received a $400,000 grant from the federal government
to develop a meatpacking plant at an industrial site along a
railroad spur at Box Elder. The project fell through during
negotiations, and the tribe had to send the money back. It
was considered a major set-back. 2 3 Still, tribal planners
would like to see an industrial park at the site and hope to
coordinate it with the ethanol/feedlot project, as well as
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the tribal farm.
— Recreational development. The ski area could
become a year-round recreational park. The tribe has
discussed building a waterslide and a golf course as well as
hiking trails. 2 4 The Chippewa-Cree believe they could
capitalize on the attraction of the Bear Paw Mountains, the
only mountains within a radius of 100 miles.
For these projects to succeed, the tribe will need
to overcome a variety of obstacles, but one in particular is
the lack of capital. Says Wright: "There isn't a chance in
hell (for economic success) unless we get some financial
support."
In a climate of ever-increasing competition for
federal dollars, the Chippewa-Cree find themselves at a
disadvantage because of their small size, and because they
have no track record.
"We just need that first project," according to
Weist, who believes the Chippewa-Cree deserve a chance to
show they can do something successful.
Yet Weist admits that the problems here, and on many
other reservations, aren't limited to a lack of federal
money. Weist, a non-Indian with experience on a number of
reservations, also sees the Chippewa-Cree dealing with a
host of internal problems.
Businesses have difficulty negotiating with tribal
governments which don't act in a business-like manner, he
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says, and such has been the case at Rocky Boy's. He says
elected tribal officials have, at times, lacked "business
savvy." While the tribal staff may sport college-educated
Indians who understand the realities of the outside world,
elected tribal leaders sometimes lack the skills necessary
to help the tribe function outside of the reservation
vacuum, he says.
For example, convincing tribal leaders here of the
need for solid, long-term economic development plans — the
kind he says are only now being drawn up by tribal planners
— has been a difficult task.
As for the future, Weist says he believes the
Chippewa-Cree have a chance at economic self-sufficiency,
although he acknowledges it will probably take a painfully
long time to reach that goal. Cuts in federal aid only
hamper the development of a reservation economy, because the
tribe has very little to build on in the first place. In the
case of the Chippewa-Cree, it's easy to see how federal
budget-cutting policies have become perceived as an
insidious reincarnation of the federal government's 1950s
termination efforts.
On a positive note, Overberg praises the ChippewaCree for its educational gains and improvement in the
professional management of its government. But he admits
that the Chippewa-Cree, more than other tribes, face an
uphill struggle for survival.
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"With no money in the bank, you can dream, but you
can't get anything started," he says.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE FORT BELKNAP INDIAN RESERVATION

Lost Wealth, Poor Land, Combine
to Make Economic Development an A1lusive Goal

As members of the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre tribes
of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation like to tell it, the
story of economic development on their reservation begins
with a major rip-off.
They say theirs is a story of what could have been,
a story of how today's poverty stricken people on their
reservation might have become rich beyond their
imaginations. What happened is quite simple and follows
similar variations on a theme typically heard in Indian
Country: whites took advantage of the Indians to gain
control of a valuable natural resource.
Delmar "Poncho" Bigby, a tribal planner who
specializes in water rights and natural resource
development, also enjoys studying his people's past: pawing
through old documents, checking out the old maps,
identifying what's happened to tribal lands. He considers
himself an expert on the negotiations of 1885 between George
Bird Grinnell, representing the United States government,
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and his own forefathers, the tribal leaders at that time. 1
Bigby says that his people received $350,000 for a
13,000-acre chunk of the Little Rocky Mountains, the
reservation's only high country. But he claims that
negotiations were not fair. Grinnell, he says, denied
Indians information about the land's value, and he gave the
Indians only two choices: accept the government's offer, or
starve.
Indeed, that's what transcripts from the
negotiations appear to say. 2 Here's what Grinnell told the
Assiniboine and Gros Ventre that year:

I see that some of you people are
pretty blind, you can't see far. You see the
things that are close to your face, but the
things that are further off you cannot see at
all. You are like people looking through a
fog. . . . You think that because for seven
or eight years, you have had plenty to eat
and have lived well, for the next year or two
you are going to have plenty to eat and it
will always go on like that. That is not
true; it is not going to last. I go among the
different people and see them, how they are
fixed, how many cattle they've got, how they
farm; I don't see anybody as poor as you.
Two years from now, if you don't make
any agreement with the government, you will
just have to kill your cattle and then you
will have to starve. . . . The only thing you
have to sell is this little piece of land
that you do not use. I should like to see you
sell that, because if you don't, I cannot
tell after two years how you will live." 3

The Assiniboine and Gros Ventre did, indeed, follow
Grinnell's advice to sell the property. But the deal was
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hardly fair, especially since the option of letting the
Indians develop their own resources — however ludicrous
that option must have seemed to Grinnell — was never
presented.
During the first few years of this century, the
former tribal lands in the Little Rockies became a center of
gold mining activity in Montana. Historical accounts say
mines at Landusky and Zortman were the most productive in
the state between 1900 and 1904.^ They remain active today,
bringing in millions of dollars in revenue for Pegasus Gold,
a Spokane, Wash., firm. The gross value of gold and silver
taken out of those hills is reportedly $25 million
annually.^ The Landusky-Zortman mines employ about 100
people, and has an annual payroll of $5 million.®
By contrast, the Fort Belknap tribes are able to
generate just $500,000 annually, primarly through leasing
its range- and pasture-land to non-Indian farmers or
ranchers.^ So when tribal members look south to the
mountains from their dry prairie landscape in the Milk River
Valley, it's easy to see why they feel cheated.
"Can you imagine how wealthy we'd be," asks Lennore
Stiffarm, a Harvard-educated Ph.D who directs the tribal
education department and is a special consultant to the
elected tribal community council.® The answer, although
speculative, is that the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre could
well have been the richest Indians in North America,
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according to Greg Smitman, the Bureau of Indian Affairs
Q
natural resource officer.
Bigby says the tribe is hoping to someday be
compensated for its loss. He maintains that his forefathers
were not only taken advantage of by not knowing about the
gold or its potential value, but that there was no intent on
the part of his people to "sell" the land. He says Indians
at that time did not understand the concept of buying and
selling land. Instead, his forefathers thought that what
they were doing was more like a "lease," in today's
terminology, and that the lease has since expired, he says.
The issue remains unresolved as far as the tribes
are concerned, and tribal lawyers continue to pursue what
they believe to be the tribes' legal right to the Little
Rockies.
Meanwhile, economic development here focuses on
education, expanding agriculture, and attracting a
manufacturing plant to a renovated industrial building. But
with tribal revenues of about $500,000, there's little left
over to invest after meeting the costs of running tribal
government.
Instead of dwelling on the past, though, tribal
planners say they are trying to meet the challenges of their
present situation. 1 ® Like their neighbors at Rocky Boy's,
the Fort Belknap tribes have no big-money resources. There's
hope that gold may be discovered in the tribes' remaining
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portion of the Little Rockies. And it is hard to not notice
the row of oil wells just off the reservation's western
boundary. Someday exploration for petroleum resources may
yield a few producing wells on reservation lands.
Unemployment is about 78 percent, and more than 65
percent of the resident Indians lives in poverty. 1 1 Yet
tribal leaders say they anxiously greet the future. "As
Indians, we do not have the option to give up," says
Stiffarm, who recently returned to the reservation after
teaching and conducting research at UCLA and Stanford in
California. Stiffarm is among the growing number of educated
Indians working for a tribal government in Montana. Her
attitude is typical of Indian leaders today.
One tool the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre tribes are
implementing to help overcome their problems is education.
Stiffarm says programs designed to teach the cultures of her
people while helping them ease into the modern world have
begun. If the two tribes are to survive, she says, they need
to develop their human resources — but in a way that won't
sacrifice cultural identities.
She recalls the story of her father, who attended a
BIA boarding school in the early part of this century; he
and other young Indians were beaten if they spoke their
native language. Such is not the philosophy of Indian
education anymore. Two educational programs at Fort Belknap
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— a computer-assisted development project and a national
computer training clearinghouse — are new and they provide
hope that the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre tribes will move
closer to their educational goals. Both programs feature
Apple computers and are designed for use in the schools.
The computer-assisted development project was
implemented in 1986 at the nearby Harlem junior and senior
high schools. It teaches native languages and customs by
using software developed specifically for the Gros Ventre
and Assiniboine by the tribal education office, says Preston
Stiffarm, a Harlem teacher and Fort Belknap tribal member
who supervises the program. 1 2
The software features old-time stories and legends
along with computer illustrations from each of the tribe's
past. It is understood that Indians perform much better in
school if they clearly understand their ethnic identity.
Further, what's being done for the Gros Ventre is also done
for the Assiniboine, an action taken to ease tension between
the two tribes, once enemies.
The other program, the National Computer Training
Clearinghouse, offers instruction for Indian teachers from
throughout the West. Modesto Rosales Jr., a University of
Montana computer science graduate, says he helps teachers
learn how to introduce computers into their curricula. 1 3
Rosales has also been working with tribal government staff
to improve their commuter skills. Too many Indians are using

71

computers as nothing more than "glorified word processors"
and not using them to their full potential, he says.
In the realm of business development, tribal planner
Bill Walls says he believes the timing may be right for some
positive change on the Fort Belknap Reservation. 1 ^
But he says, "we are running out of chances."
Recognizing that the days of relatively abundant sources of
federal money are gone, he says his people better get
something started soon. "Federal money is drying up. We have
to put on our business hats."
While the Assiniboine and Gros Ventre tribes are
making strides in self-determination policy — the
government is getting more sophisticated, for example —
former four-year tribal chairman and current BIA official
Jack Plumage says problems remain. 1 ^ As is the case
elsewhere, tribal government has been highly unstable, with
a new tribal chairman every two years.
"Hell, it takes you that long just to find where the
bathroom is," according to Plumage.
Planning efforts have also been hampered by too many
"crises," he says, adding that each new chairman tends to
have a different set of priorities. And while the
Assiniboine and Gros Ventre, once bitter rivals, have lived
on the same reservation in peace for a century, there
remains a clear distinction between the two tribes.
Political divisions stem from these cultural roots, as each
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tribe elects an equal number of representatives to the
governing council.
Because of these and other problems, Walls and
others have called for the establishment of an apolitical
development corporation to be established in 1987. It is
designed to eliminate political or unprofessional actions
from the tribes' business activities. Other tribes in
Montana have established similar organizations.
The corporation will be an arm of the community
council, but it will be staffed with the tribes' best
business experts. It is hoped the community council will
give the new corporation a significant degree of autonomy so
that it can make decisions in an efficient manner. 1 ® The
first goal of the new corporation will be to fill an empty
but renovated 38,000-square-foot industrial building with
something similar to what the Fort Peck Reservation has done
with its A&S Industries. 1 ^ The Fort Peck venture, which
makes netting and medical chests for the U.S. armed
services, employs up to 500 people, mostly tribal members.
To accomplish this goal, the Assiniboine and Gros
Ventre are working with a North Dakota State University
professor to figure out ways to match military contracts
with the Fort Belknap Reservation and an outside corporation
to provide management and capital. A large potential work
force, tax incentives, a community college, and a vocational
program are being used to promote Fort Belknap. 1 ®
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However, agriculture is seen by the present tribal
chairman as the reservation's best long-term economic bet.
"We're in an agriculture region, and we ought to be looking
at agriculture," says William T. "Snuffy" Main, who was
elected tribal chairman in 1986.

19

Similar advice has been given in BIA-sponsored
reports, which see a

potential for more than 100,000 acres
o r\
of irrigated farmland. u These lands could support a variety

of crops including alfalfa, winter and spring wheat, oats,
barley, flax, mustard, hay, beans, safflower, potatoes,
J1
sugarbeets, as well as hogs, cattle, and sheep. - L Yet those

same reports recognize the extreme weather conditions — the
cold winters, short growing season, lack of precipitation —
and say irrigation would be necessary and costly. 2 2
The community council has given Bigby the task of
revamping a tribal farming venture that is, like its
counterpart at Rocky Boy's, a financial drain. Bigby says
the farm, at five years old, suffered from poor management
and irresponsible fiscal policies, along with other problems
inherent to agriculture. But due to good weather and a
change in personnel, the farm was expected to show its first
profit ever in 1986.
Called Milk River Farms, it is a 640-acre irrigated
project with 337 acres in winter wheat, spring wheat and
oats, five acres of potatoes, 125 acres of grass hay, and
173 acres of pasture.
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Its future "can only be limited by the imagination,"
according to Bigby. For example, his vision — and it's a
vision unclouded by the current farm and ranch crisis in
Montana — includes a herd of 6,000 cattle, 10,000 acres of
irrigated cropland, 50,000 acres of dry-land farming, and
the establishment of a grain alcohol/feedlot enterprise. But
if the tribes do follow Bigby's plans, they will have to
tackle their controversial nature. Many tribal members run
their own farms and see the tribal venture as potential
competition. These people have had a different philosophy
toward agriculture, preferring individual farms rather than
a large cooperative agricultural venture.
The collapse in 1986 of a proposal to purchase an
8,000-acre irrigated farm and ranch along the Milk River
illustrates the problems faced by tribal ventures in
agriculture. 2 ^ The BIA agreed to lend the tribes $1.5
million for a downpayment on the farming enterprise, which
is located along Highway 2. But, the project fell through
after the community council put the question up to a vote of
tribal members. It was defeated in a special election.
If the tribes were to ever launch a massive
agricultural development, the complicated issue of water
rights would have to be settled. The Assiniboine and Gros
Ventre tribes have long recognized the importance of water,
and to their credit they have one of the nation's most
significant water rulings backing them up. 2 ^ Shortly after

75

the turn of the century, the federal government went to
court on behalf of the tribes to secure their right to a
significant portion of the Milk River, which flows across
the northern portion of the reservation. In the landmark
1908 decision that became known as the "Winters Doctrine,"
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the tribes had a special
right to water from the Milk River. °
The Supreme Court established the concept of a
federal reserved water right, and said that since the
Indians had been first in time, they therefore had the first
right to use the water for present and future uses.

n7

Yet

despite this powerful ally, the water issue along the Milk
River Valley remains terribly complex and controversial. The
BIA's Greg Smitman estimates that the Milk River is overallocated by 400 percent, and People's Creek, which flows
from the Bear Paw Mountains across the reservation, is overallocated by 300 percent. There's enough water for everyone
in a wet year like 1986, but not during a drought.
Given the myriad of problems the Belknap Indians
face — water shortages, lack of resources, barren land,
little money, political turmoil, and declining federal aid - it remains to be seen whether the Assiniboine and Gros
Ventre will be able to meet their goals of selfdetermination and self-sufficiency.
Yet it seems that these tribes, like their neighbors
on Rocky Boy's Reservation, illustrate the need for
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widespread education and vocational training. To that end,
Plumage says progress is being made. He sees more of the
reservation's young people coming home after college to
apply their skills on behalf of the tribes. Still, too often
they stay away, leaving the lesser-educated tribal members
with the job of getting ready for the 21st century.
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CHAPTER FIVE

THE NORTHERN CHEYENNE INDIAN RESERVATION

Isolation, energy slump, and political turmoi1
in land of Morning Star people

Harvard-educated Joe Little Coyote, an outspoken
Northern Cheyenne leader, says he's never seen his people in
such poor economic and political shape. 1
After 16 years under the steady tribal chairmanship
of Allan Rowland, who retired in 1984 and died a short time
later, tribal government is in a state of disarray. The two
subsequent tribal chairmen were removed from office, and the
tribal court barred the man elected in late 1986, Robert
Bailey, from taking office pending a legal challenge by his
predecessor, who was ousted by the tribal council on charges
of corruption.
"Investors don't want to touch us with a ten-foot
pole because we're so damn unstable," says Little Coyote,
who was an unsuccessful candidate for the tribal chairman's
position in the most recent election.
The economy of the Northern Cheyenne Reservation,
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with a resident population of about 3,100 tribal members who
call themselves the Morning Star people, has taken a sharp
turn for the worse in the 1980s — from the hope of oil and
gas riches to the despair of having to rely almost entirely
upon the federal government in an era of big budget cuts.
Unemployment has steadily increased, from 34 percent
in 1979 to more than 60 percent in 1986.

Tribal revenues

have dropped from several million dollars a year just three
years ago, to an estimated $500,000 for 1987, primarily
because ARCO canceled an oil and gas lease agreement with
the tribe two years ago after failing to find any
significant petroleum reserves under the 444,157-acre
"5
reservation. J
The tribe is going broke, says Little Coyote, a
former tribal official who helped negotiate that ARCO deal
and was in charge of the tribal oil and gas office. Little
Coyote now presides over a $1.2 million independent
development fund established through the assistance of the
St. Labre Catholic Mission at Ashland.
The sad part about it, he says, is that tribal
government has put forth little effort to generate any
economic development. Government has instead been too busy
dealing with its own political turmoil.
With no industry or manufacturing and little retail
business or tourism, the Northern Cheyenne Reservation is
primarly an agriculture- and resource-based society,
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according to Bureau of Indian Affairs Natural Resource
Officer Bill Watters. 4 Given the tribe's current depressed
conditions — politically, economically and socially —
Watters doesn't see much change "for many years to come."
Yet, despite today's gloomy picture, the Northern
Cheyenne are considered a people with great economic
potential, due to their natural resources.^ The reservation,
Montana's second smallest, is endowed with range, forest,
water, and coal reserves. And even though ARCO failed to
find petroleum reserves large enough for development, future
development by a smaller company isn't ruled out.
Clearly, should the tribe ever decide to develop
those resources at a time when their relative values are
high, they stand to make a great deal of money.
Coal is the most abundant. BIA Billings-area
geologist Rick Stefanic estimates total reserves at 56
billion tons, with 3.3 billion tons recoverable given
today's technology and market conditions.® Virtually the
entire reservation is underlain by coal, as is much of
southeastern Montana and neighboring northeastern Wyoming.
During the 1970s, with oil and gas prices high, a coal boom
brought strip mines on three sides of the Northern Cheyenne
Reservation, including one mine developed by the Northern
Cheyenne's Indian neighbors, the Crow.
However, the Northern Cheyenne, due to environ
mental, social, and spiritual reasons, decided not to
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develop their coal. 7 Instead, they chose another course of
action, one which may have been the smartest given the
present recession in the coal industry.
With strip mines starting up all around the Northern
Cheyenne, and with projections of future coal-fired
generating plants throughout the region, tribal leaders at
the time believed that their culture would be threatened by
the potential massive influx of whites and the new values
these new people would bring. Drugs, alcohol, and
materialism were feared.
"We will be taught materialism. We will be taught
that we can have anything at the touch of a button. We will
be taught to take things for granted," said Tom Gardner, the
Q

tribal executive director, in 1974.

"It could bring in bad

traits — drug traffic, mugging and discrimination. We will
be a minority on our own reservation," he predicted.
Meanwhile, the Crow Reservation to the west was
eagerly developing its coal, but under different
circumstances. Crow coal was being strip mined off their
reservation, on land that had been ceded to the federal
government decades ago. The Crow had retained mineral rights
to the area.
The Northern Cheyenne planned a different strategy,
one that would not only preclude strip mining on their
reservation but would give them some control over
development that was taking place around them. The Northern

83

Cheyenne had the air over their reservation placed in the
Class I category, the highest possible classification under
federal standards. This classification is generally reserved
for national parks and wilderness areas, although the
Flathead and Fort Peck Indian reservations followed the
Northern Cheyenne's lead and gained Class I air status.
When Montana Power Co. (MPC) wanted to build two new
electricity generating plants just north of the reservation
at Colstrip, the tribe found themselves in a position to
negotiate a settlement with MPC; in 1979, MPC agreed to
provide Indians jobs, scholarships for tribal members, and
pay for some of the social costs associated with the local
growth in population.

g

The Northern Cheyenne, in turn,

agreed to stop holding up construction of the 700-megawatt
Colstrip units 3 and 4, which had threatened the
reservation's air quality status. 1 ® As a result, MPC has
become one of the major Indian employers in southeastern
Montana.
At the end of 1985, 94 of the 635 MPC employees at
Colstrip were Northern Cheyenne Indians, says Dennis
Limberhand, special projects coordinator for MPC who also
serves on the Montana Human Rights Commission. 1 1 Another 12
Northern Cheyenne were working for MPC subcontractors, says
Limberhand, a Northern Cheyenne tribal member who has the
difficult job of smoothing relations between his people and
MPC.
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During the construction phase of the two new units,
known as Colstrip 3 and Colstrip 4, as many as 200 Northern
Cheyenne were employed out of a workforce of 2,000. "We have
Cheyennes in all areas now," he says, adding that some have
become shift supervisors and journeyman plant operators.
"You don't conquer this industry over night."
One positive result of the MPC development,
according to Limberhand, has been a change in attitude among
many Northern Cheyenne, who have typically made a living by
part-time or seasonal work with the BIA or U.S. Forest
Service on fire, road, or trail crews. He believes Northern
Cheyenne Indians who hold down jobs at Colstrip may be
setting an example for younger tribal members.
"The work ethic is just catching on," he says,
adding: "Our generation is really the first-generation of
lunch-packers."
While strip mining was not acceptable to tribal
members, oil and gas development was considered a viable
economic alternative because they perceived it to be less
environmentally degrading, according to Little Coyote.
Negotiations between the tribe and ARCO led to a lease which
spanned 33 years, provided the tribe with a $6 million in
up-front bonus payments, and added a number of other
provisions. Some of those were:
— a committment by ARCO that it would spend a
minimum of $20 million in exploration over the first six

85

years of the contract.
— a tribal royalty rate of 25 percent.
— a minimum of $1 million in annual lease payments,
with higher lease payments on lands which become
19
productive. - L ^
Tribal and BIA hopes were high that significant
reserves of oil or gas would be found. A 1980 draft
environmental impact statement predicted up to 5 million
barrels of oil and 20 billion to 30 billion cubic feet of
natural gas. 1 3
Seven wells were drilled. But ARCO pulled out after
the third year of the agreement, exercising a right it had
under a special provision of the contract. 1 4 Not all tests
were negative, according to Watters. But he says ARCO
decided there wasn't enough oil or gas to make commercial
development feasible. There's hope that a smaller company
will some day return to the reservation when market
conditions improve.
Today, the Northern Cheyenne are looking to their
timber resources as a potential revenue producer. 1 ^ In 1986,
the tribe was negotiating the purchase of a lumber mill at
Ashland, with the assistance of the economic development
fund administered by Little Coyote and the St. Labre
Mission. Northern Cheyenne Industries, an economic
development arm of tribal government, has been involved in
negotiations that seek to get the mill under Indian control.
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If the Northern Cheyenne succeed, an estimated 100 Indian
jobs would be created. 1 ®
The mill could tap timber supplies from around the
region, including an allowable cut of 10 million board feet
annually from the Northern Cheyenne Reservation alone. 1 7
Other timber could come from the Crow Reservation to the
west, the Custer National Forest to the east, or nearby
private sources. Watters estimates the Northern Cheyenne
have the potential to run 15 million to 18 million board
feet per year through the Ashland mill.
Range resources are currently providing the bulk of
1 ft

the tribe's annual revenue through a leasing program. ° Of a
total 444,775 acres on the reservation, 400,000 are
considered range. A recent BIA range survey found that the
conditions were good, despite recent drought years.

I Q

To coordinate the reservation's variety of
resources, the BIA is drafting a new integrated management
plan that will be a prototype for Indian reservations around
the West, according to Norris "Mack" Cole, Billings-Area BIA
assistant director. 2 ® "We've got a lot of data," Cole says,
"but it is stored in different places and is not easily
accessible."
The plan, scheduled to be completed in 1987, will be
computerized and flexible to allow resource planners to look
at how various management scenerios will effect such
resources as water, range, wildlife, and timber. It should
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help the Northern Cheyenne develop solid, long-term resource
management plans — something that has been missing on this
and other reservations, Cole says.
While Cole and Watters see natural resources as an
essential building block to an economic development plan,
the BIA's Sharon Limberhand points out that the
reservation's remote location presents a major impediment to
growth. 2 1 U.S. Highway 212 crosses the reservation on its
route from Interstate 90 through the Crow Reservation, Lame
Deer, Ashland, the Custer National Forest, and Alzada. But
the road from Crow Agency to Ashland is narrow, winding, and
hilly. Lame Deer, a town of two gas sations, four cafes, a
grocery store, and a small lumber mill, is about an hour's
drive from Interstate 90 and two hours from Billings. Rapid
City is up to five hours away.
Other problems exist, and they contribute to a mood
of frustration and despair. There's no high school at Lame
Deer. Children attend either the Catholic school 25 miles
north at Colstrip or 25 miles east at the St. Labre Catholic
Mission in Ashland. Health care is limited. A clinic
provides some emergency services, but the nearest hospital
is at Crow Agency, 45 miles west.
Even the mood at the Dull Knife Community College,
one the the nation's first Indian community colleges, is
depressed. Admissions Director Bill Wertman, recognizing the
goal of meshing community college curricula with tribal
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economic development plans, notes that "there just isn't a
lot of economic development going on here." 2 2 A major focus
of the community college is educating the community on the
problems with alcohol abuse, a disease affecting 95 percent
of the families here, according to Wertman.
In societies where educated Indians say their
knowledge brings discrimination upon themselves from their
own people, community colleges can provide a vital bridge
between the Indian community and its youth by becoming a
center of education, culture, and recreation. Further,
Wertman believes Indian youths have a hard time finding
positive role models in communities suffering from chronic
alcoholism, and community colleges can meet that need. But
staffing at the college in 1986 was down 25 percent from
1985 due to budget cuts, and students are finding it more
difficult to obtain financial aid. 2 3
All these issues lead Sharon Limberhand to assess
the present status of the Northern Cheyenne in negative
terms: "It's a pretty bad situation."
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CHAPTER SIX

THE CROW INDIAN RESERVATION

Self-government tops priority 1ist
on state's largest reservation

Crow leaders face a major challenge: starting from
scratch to set up a government that can lead their people
toward economic self-sufficiency and political selfdetermination. They've tried it before; this time, they hope
they can make it work.
In 1980, the Bureau of Indian Affairs took over the
Crow's day-to-day governmental operations after a federal
audit found widespread mismanagement of money and what BIA
Billings-Area Director Richard Whitesell called "politics
run a m u c k . A federal BIA employee was placed in the top
tribal government management position to direct the Crow
down a path of fiscal and political responsibility.
Last August, in a much heralded ceremony, federal
officials literally returned the keys of the tribal office
back to a new Crow government. Current BIA policy, Whitesell
says, dictates that tribes must be allowed to fail, as well

92

as succeed, if they are to ever break from the paternalistic
grips of the federal government. Returning Crow government
to the Crow people is an example of that policy.
The new Crow government is making their first order
of business the establishment of credible accounting,
O
record-keeping, and procurement procedures.' 6 "All this is
non-existent at this time," according to tribal Chairman
Richard Real Bird. "Before we can go into business, these
systems need to be in place." Once the new systems are
working, Real Bird hopes that the Crow can begin to change
the immense social and economic problems felt by his people,
people he says "want progress, but are afraid of change."
As they are on other Montana reservations,
unemployment, poverty and alcoholism on the Crow Reservation
are pervasive. The tribe's economy, based on mining, timber,
agriculture, and federal aid, is suffering terribly. Tribal
income, mostly from coal royalties, has been as high as $8
million a year during the past decade, but dropped to about
$3 million in 1986. 3 If the energy market continues its
slump, tribal income is expected to drop even farther.
Planner Leonard Bends predicted the annual Crow budget will
fall to under $1 million a year by the end of the decade.
Unemployment has risen steadily since 1980. Census
figures showed 35 percent unemployment six years ago.^ The
following year, that rate had worsened to 44 percent.^
Tribal officials say unemployment now stands at least 80
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percent.^ The situation was at its worst in the winter of
1985-1986, when unemployment peaked at 93 percent, with 97
percent of all households receiving some form of general
assistance or welfare, according to Real Bird.
Real Bird hopes that his people can put their
reputation for irresponsibility and political confusion
behind them. To establish credibility, he has hired two Crow
leaders with extensive backgrounds in financial management.
Barney Old Coyote, a former president of the American Indian
National Bank in Washington, D.C., has taken over as tribal
manager. And John Old Elk, an accountant and financial
manager with energy company experience, is the new financial
director for the tribe.
According to Old Elk, "We're drawing a line from
July 1 (1986) and going forward."

The immediate task for

Old Elk and Old Coyote is to get the tribe's accounting
system certified. This task includes such basic tasks as
paying old bills, Old Elk says, to prevent such services as
power or telephone from being cut off. The previous
government — even with a federal manager in place — let
too many bills go unpaid, as tribal revenues dried up,
according to Old Elk.
Old Elk hopes to bring a corporate perspective to
tribal government. He says he wants to create a framework
whereby tribal members see themselves as corporate
shareholders, and their elected leaders as executive
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officers. However, while tribal leaders like Old Elk and
Real Bird speak in terms of running tribal government like a
business, the political system they must work within remains
far removed from the model of a successful corporation.
One of the problems stems from the Crow holding
tight to a part of their heritage. As a people, the Crow
have been relatively successful at maintaining their Indian
identities, traditional values, and native language. But
they also retained a form of government that, while it may
be as close to pure democracy as possible, has been highly
O
criticized for being inefficient. The Crow are governed by
a "general council" composed of all tribal men over 21 years
old and women over 18. Each has a vote in the council, which
meets four times a year to set policy for the tribe's four
elected officers.
Real Bird, who says he has no plans to seek a change
in this form of government, admits that this "grassroots
democracy" has created problems. It has not allowed for
long-term planning, which is considered essential for
economic development. The tribe frequently splits over key
issues, he says, and lets politics get in the way of
efficient decision making.
Tribal planner Leonard Bends, whose speciality is
economic development, believes the system eventually will
change. The tribe is too large, he says, and the system is
too cumbersome to mesh with the modern, outside business
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world. Bends, like his counterparts on other Montana
reservations, says there is no way the Crow can have
economic development unless politics is removed from tribal
business activities. Unfortunately, separating politics from
business is impossible now.
"We fumble a lot," Bends says, adding, "when we
fumble, we have to wait three months to correct the fumble."
However, Bends says it would be political suicide
for a tribal chairman to suggest a change in government
structure. Any chairman who did would find himself "thrown
off the reservation," Bends says. Indeed, the Crow have a
reputation for removing tribal chairmen before their terms
expire.
Bends takes an optimistic look at Real Bird and his
goal to work within the system. "If anybody can do it, he
can," Bends says, praising Real Bird's determination to
revitalize a system of committees to handle a variety of
tribal affairs and to provide a link between the
administrative officers and the general council. That link
can smooth potentially rough political waters, he says.
Bends also praises Real Bird for bucking a previous
tribal government trend to ignore college-educated Indians
for government positions. Bends, who worked for the previous
administration, says it used to be that people with college
degrees were shunned and couldn't find a place within tribal
government.
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Bends remembers returning from Eastern Montana
College several years ago and being challenged by a tribal
elder who told him that he didn't belong on the reservation
because he had a college degree. He was told that collegeeducated Indians can find work off the reservation, so
that's where they should go; tribal jobs should go to the
un-educated, unemployed, because they need the jobs.
If the basic government reforms can be made, the
tribal administration can look to the Crow's vast natural
resources for the basic economic building blocks needed to
build a viable economy. "The Crow tribe is blessed with an
abundance of natural resources. We've got over 50 billion
tons of coal, we also have water, we have oil and gas, and
we have land. We have everything necessary to be selfsufficient," Real Bird says.
The Crow Reservation is Montana's largest. It covers
more than 2.2 million acres, with the tribal membership of
about 7,000 controlling about 68 percent of the land; nonIndians control remaining lands. The Crow have mineral
rights to another million acres under land north of the
reservation to the Yellowstone River. And it is in this area
— at Westmoreland Resources, Inc.'s Absaloka Mine — where
Montana's only Indian coal is being developed.
The mining tract, covering about 15,000 acres, has
recoverable reserves of about 600 million tons and has been
the major source of revenue — more than $21 million in
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royalties — for the tribe since the first train load of
Q
coal was shipped out in 1974.
But the mine has been in trouble, according to
Westmoreland Resources General Manager David Simpson. 1 ® He
notes that the tribe has earned significant revenue from the
mine and says it has provided Indian employment beyond
tribal- or federal-government payrolls. But the current
energy slump has taken its toll on Westmoreland Resources
and the Crow. Further, the mine has not lived up to
expectations.
"The people of the Crow Nation view coal as the
black gold that will transform welfare recipients into
capitalists," according to a Billings Gazette special
publication in 1 9 7 4 . C r o w Minerals Committee member Eloise
Pease was quoted at the time as saying: "We're tired of
handouts. We would like to exploit our own wealth for a
19
change." x
The article was up-beat, saying that coal was the
way for the tribe to reduce its 29 percent unemployment
rate. But instead of dropping, the unemployment rate on the
reservation has actually risen in the years since coal
development began. Instead of the Absaloka Mine producing
the anticipated 15 million tons per year, production peaked
in 1979 at 5 million tons, and it had leveled off to about 2
million tons in 1986. 1 3 Employment at the mine has declined
to about 25 workers, down from an average of 60 to 80 in the
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late 1970s and early 1980s.^ About half those are Crow
Indians.^
Building a coal-fired generating plant was once
considered an appealing tribal option and could have
employed hundreds of Crow Indians, but Class I air quality
status on the neighboring Northern Cheyenne Reservation has
cast a political cloud on that issue. The current depressed
price of coal has amplified problems. Now, Real Bird says
the tribe is looking at a possible joint venture with
another Indian tribe. Crow coal could be shipped to the
other reservation, where a generating plant could convert it
to electricity. This plan would, no doubt, be controversial.
The Crow also had hoped to develop a second coal
mine, this one with Shell Oil Co., but Shell pulled out in
1985, blaming the sagging conditions of the energy industry,
conditions that make new coal development in Montana
unlikely at present.
According to Simpson, coal companies' problems in
Montana are complex. They are tied to the world price of
oil, the quality and quantity of coal, the cost of mining,
and the cost to transport coal to market. One issue that has
been hotly debated is whether Montana's severance tax should
apply to Crow coal. The Crow tribe maintains that its coal,
held in trust for the tribe by the federal government, falls
outside of state jurisdiction and should therefore not be
subject to state taxation. 1 ® Meanwhile, the state claims
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that Crow coal is like any other private coal reserves and,
as a consequence, it should be taxed. A federal judge has
sided with the state, but that ruling was appealed by the
Crow Tribe. Regardless of the outcome, the issue is expected
to end up in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Nevertheless, Crow coal will continue to be a part
of the reservation's economy for years to come. Total
recoverable reserves are estimated at 600 million tons. "At
the rate we're going, it will take a long time to deplete
the lease," according to Simpson.
One thing is for certain, according to Real Bird.
Future coal development will most likely involve a joint
venture instead of a lease agreement. Joint ventures were
allowed for the first time with the passage of the 1982
Indian Mineral Leasing and Development Act. This act has
been successfully employed in oil and gas development by the
tribes of the Fort Peck and Blackfeet reservations.
Besides coal development, the Crow have been
directing their economic development activities toward
several other areas:
— Winning a $60 million to $100 million settlement
from the federal government over an alleged surveying error
that denied the Crow about 36,000 coal-rich acres. The Crow
hired former Secretary of Interior James Watt to represent
them, but they recently terminated their contract with Watt.
The case is still pending in court. 1 7
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— A small hydro-electric plant on the Big Horn
River below Yellowtail Dam is being investigated. Details
are being studied with state and federal officials. If the
project wins approval, it could provide construction jobs
and long-term employment, plus annual revenues from the sale
of power.

1 ft

— Sun Lodge, a run-down motel along 1-90 near Crow
Agency, is being renovated.

19

The lodge is located near the

Custer Battlefield, where the Northern Cheyenne and Sioux
teamed up with various other bands to deliver the U.S.
Cavalry its most famous defeat.
— A business such as the Fort Peck tribes' A&S
Industries, which capitalizes on military support contracts,
is being sought for a 105,000-square-feet building that once
housed a carpet mill.

o ft
The Crow are working with a North

Dakota State University professor to match their reservation
with a company and product to be manufactured or assembled
on their reservation.
— A small shopping mall, owned and operated by the
01
tribe, is also being considered for Crow Agency. • L Most Crow
shop off the reservation in Hardin or Billings, and as a
result, money brought into the reservation leaves almost
immediately, a problem common with most Montana
reservations.
While the above projects are seen as having
potential benefits for the Crow, tribal planner Bends
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doesn't see any immediate way out out his people's problems.
"There is no quick solution," he says, making this
prediction: "It's going to take five or six years to turn it
around." Given this reservation's track record, Bends may be
overly optimistic; merely reaching the top Crow goal of
fiscal responsibility will be a significant achievement.
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PART TWO

THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI TRIBES
THE WESTERN MONTANA'S FLATHEAD INDIAN RESERVATION

CHAPTER ONE

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FLATHEAD INDIAN RESERVATION

Salish and Kootenai
find that resources, location
give them an advantage

Confederated Salish and Kootenai tribal officials
acknowledge that, compared with other Indian reservations in
America, their's is among the most blessed. Tribal vicechairman Ron Therriault says he's quick to recognize that
fact every time he visits another reservation in Montana or
elsewhere in the West. 1
While many reservations are on land that includes
the poorest in the country, the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes occupy a scenic, 1.2-million acre tract of
western Montana that ranges from fertile agricultural land
in the valley to commercial-grade forests to mountains,
glaciers and high-mountain lakes.
Since the reservation was created in 1855, but
mostly since the 1975 Indian Education and Self
Determination Act, the Flathead people have been getting
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better and better at turning their natural resources into
valuable economic assets. They have also become a leading
voice for environmental protection.
The Salish and Kootenai have one of the better
tribal economies in the nation, and they find themselves
best off, economically, of all seven Montana Indian
reservations. They play a central role in shaping the
economic and political future of a significant portion of
Montana: that portion of the state between Kalispell and
Missoula. And Indian leaders' presence can be felt in both
Missoula and Kalispell.
The Salish and Kootenai tribal government is the
largest employer in Lake County, accounting for about 500
jobs. 2 The tribal budget, business enterprises, and salaries
boost the local economy by at least $20 million annually,
Therriault says. Indians own more than 150 private
businesses on the reservation, about half of those are farms
or ranches. 3
Pointing to the tribes' economic contribution to the
Valley, Therriault says, "We are not bad neighbors at all."
Unemployment on the Flathead Reservation is about 27
percent, compared with a range of 40 percent to 85 percent
on other Montana reservations.^ All other Montana Indian
reservations have suffered sharp drops in tribal revenues,
due to crashes in energy, agricultural or timber markets,
but the Flathead's have actually risen.^
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The Flathead tribes brought in $12.5 million in
1985, thanks primarly to a 1984 rent settlement between
Montana Power Co. (MPC) and the tribes over the 180-megawatt
Kerr Dam near Poison.^ Similar annual income projections are
anticipated for the near future, as the tribes can expect an
MPC rent payment of about $9 million (adjusted to inflation)
each year through 2015.
By comparison, the annual tribal revenues on the
Rocky Boy's, Fort Belknap, and Northern Cheyenne
reservations are all under $500,000. 7 The Blackfeet, Crow,
and Fort Peck Indians are all able to raise seven-digit
incomes off their natural resources, but their combined
Q

incomes in 1985 only matched the Flathead's $12.5 million. 0
On the Flathead Reservation, the economy is not
based on the volatile boom-and-bust nature of the petroleum
or coal industries. Recreation, tourism, timber, clean
industry, and hydroelectric power are viewed as the
essential building blocks to stable, long-term economic
growth and the realization of self-determination.
The reservation stretches about 60 miles southward
from the middle of Flathead Lake to about 15 miles north of
Missoula, and about 40 miles westward from the crest of the
Mission Mountains to the Lolo National Forest boundary.
Indians own or control about half of the reservation's total
land area. Most of that is the tribes' 540,000 acres of
forest land, 300,000 acres of which are considered by tribal

107

government to be of commercial value.

g

Wet by Montana standards, the Flathead Reservation
offers a sharp contrast to eastern Montana Indian
reservations, where annual precipitation is generally under
15 inches. On the Flathead, annual precipitation ranges from
a low of 15 inches in the Hot Springs area to 20 inches at
Poison and Ronan to more than 100 inches in the Mission
Mountains. 1 ® One major river, the Flathead, and two smaller
rivers, the Little Bitterroot and the Jocko, flow through
the reservation and contribute to more than 460 miles of
reservation streams. 1 1 Approximately 60,000 surface acres
1?
(about half) of Flathead Lake lies within the reservation."
The tribes also manage a 90,000-acre high-mountain
wilderness area which is home to native trout, deer, elk and
at least four endangered or threatened wildlife species:
grizzly bears, peregrine falcons, bald eagles, and wolves. 1 3 &
While most of the best agricultural land on the
reservation is owned by whites, about 20,000 acres of
Indian-owned land (both individual and tribal trust) is
farmed, producing a variety of crops including alfalfa,
wheat, barley, and silage corn. 1 ^ The Mission Valley is some
of the richest land in Montana.
The area is also a major tourism and recreational
attraction to local, regional, and national visitors who
come to hunt waterfowl on the reservation, hike on
wilderness trails, fish its waters, spend time at Flathead
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Lake, visit the National Bison Range, or explore nearby
Glacier National Park. To its advantage, the reservation is
located on Highway 93, the link between Missoula and
Kalispell, and one of the major routes between Yellowstone
and Glacier national parks. Of the 2.5 million visitors who
come to Montana each year, 60 percent, or about 1.5 million,
visit Glacier Park, bringing many of those to the
reservation.^
In comparison to all other Montana tribes, with the
possible exception of Fort Peck's Assiniboine and Sioux, the
Salish and Kootenai are clearly off to the best start in the
struggle toward self determination. Tribal officials say
that this is due to several reasons: less isolation, a
tribal population with more formal education, and more than
a century of living in close proximity to the dominant white
society. But at the top of their list is the relative
abundance of natural resources, resources which have
provided the tribes with the largest and most stable revenue
base of all Montana Indians.
"We are not absolutely dependent upon the federal
government, a fact that many non-Indians refuse to believe,"
says Jim Paro, the former tribal Natural Resources
Department director who resigned from his position in early
1987 to become manager of S&K Electronics, a tribal
electronics firm. 1 ®
Outnumbered by whites by a ratio of four to one, the
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Salish and Kootenai have found that survival presents a
continuing struggle — politically, economically, legally,
and culturally — between themselves and the dominant
society. They've lost much in the 132 years since their
forefathers signed the Treaty of Hell Gate at what would
become Missoula; their reservation once encompassed most of
western Montana, from Canada to Idaho. What's left is only
half under their control, a result of federal policies in
the early 1900s that opened the reservation to white
settlement.
But the Salish and Kootenai are making a comeback.
And they are doing so by gaining control of key natural
resources, applying management, and adopting environmental
policies that preclude rapid population growth, industrial
development or, resource exploitation.
The tribes' resource base — timber, water, fish and
wildlife, clean air, wilderness — is for the most part
renewable, provided management is sound. It is these
resources, set in the context of preserving a relatively
pristine native homeland, which have become the driving
factor behind the Flathead goal of economic self-sufficiency
and political self-determination.
Promotional material distributed by the tribes
includes a statement that the Salish and Kootenai are
following the philosophy of Cherokee Chief Doublehead who
said almost 200 years ago: "If we hold our lands, there will
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always be a turkey, or deer, or fish in the streams, for
those young who come after us." 1 7
To this end, tribal govenment has, in recent years,
declared their reservation a nuclear-free zone, adopted the
highest air quality standards possible under federal law,
regulated the transport of hazardous materials, regulated
the shoreline of that portion of Flathead which lies within
the exterior boundaries of the reservation, established a
90.000-acre wilderness, assumed control of fish and game
management, and pst-.ahlishpH an agiiaJH

lands and streambed

protection ordinance.
"People say if you do these things (environmental
protection), you can't grow," says Therriault, adding,
"Well, maybe you can't grow as an industrial power, but we
don't necessarily want to grow as an industrial power."
Therriault, who frequently speaks to non-Indian
audiences on behalf of the tribes, rarely makes a public
appearance without taking the opportunity to make a
reference to environmental protection.
"You've heard of Spaceship Earth," he says, "Well,
this is Spaceship Res.," he adds, referring to the
reservation. Saying his people cannot save the entire world
from environmental destruction, he says they can commit
themselves to preserving their corner of the world.
The environmental ethic embraced by tribal
government speaks t o a spiritual necessity: an overriding
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obligation that this generation has to the next, and to the
land itself. 1 8 But it also addresses the political realities
of self-determination policy and the demographic realities
of being a minority on his own reservation. It is, for
example, to his people's advantage to limit the growth of
the non-Indian population; whites on the reservation
outnumber the Salish and Kootenai about 3,800 to 15,800,
creating an inevitable confrontation between Indians and the
dominant white society over the reservation's resources.
Policies which limit large-scale development, that
would prevent a rapid boom in population, will only help
give the Salish and Kootenai more time to establish their
government, as well as regain lost cultural ties. Tribal
control of resources and environmental regulation helps the
Salish and Kootenai people define their concept of a tribal
homeland.
At the same time, maintaining environmental quality
on the reservation is seen by many, both Indians and nonIndians alike, as perhaps the best long-term economic bet
for the future. Non-exploitive use of the area's forests,
waters, mountains, wetlands, farmlands, and wildlife could
help this area to become a major recreation attraction. 1 ^
Movin^^ahfi^d for the tribes is synonymous with
establishiivg control

oti that region of western Montana known

as the Mission Valley. 2 ® Control issues relating to water,
recreation and wildlife will be discussed in subsequent

112

chapters.
But unfortuntely, according to Therriault, moving
ahead for the Salish and Kootenai means a confrontation with
whites, who not only outnumber the Indians but also control
or own most of the land in the valley bottoms and much of
the prime shoreline real estate along the southern half of
Flathead Lake. Therriault and others in tribal government
say the confrontation is frustrating; whites want Indians to
become self-sufficient, yet they oppose specific tribal
actions that would help them achieve such a goal.
With federal Indian aid decreasing this decade, the
Flathead tribes have been forced into raising revenue for
today's needs, as well as those needs in a future that will
likely see a continued decrease in federal support. As are
other Montana Indian tribes, the Flathead tribes are
receiving an estimated 30 percent to 40 percent less federal
money since 1980.
The Salish and Kootenai, who manage dozens of
programs once managed by the federal government, have seen
federal assistance for those programs drop from $16.7
million in 1981 to $10 million in 1987, says Jane Clairmont,
tribal grants and contracts officer. 2 2 These programs
include water resource studies, law enforcement, education,
tribal health, and economic development. The future,
according to Clairmont, "is really scary."
The need to raise more tribal funds to supplement
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lost federal revenue has pushed the Salish and Kootenai to
adopt a number of tribal ordinances that assume control of
natural resources on the reservation, and which raise money
to cover costs of resource management. But with each new
ordinance, all adopted in the name of self-determination,
and all assuming some degree of Indian authority over nonIndians, comes a new wave of ojections raised by many of the
non-tribal members living on the reservation.
Lake County Commissioner Mike Hutchin, one of many
whites living on the reservation who oppose the tribal
system, finds it hard to believe the Salish and Kootenai
have special rights from a 132-year-old treaty signed
generations ago under completely different circumstances.

J

However, the Hell Gate Treaty of 1855 does, indeed, exist,
and its provisions have been upheld in our nation's highest
court.
The result is that questions of jurisdictional
control surround virtually all aspects of land and natural
resource management on the reservation — questions such as
who owns Flathead Lake, and who should manage it? Is there a
difference between ownership of the surface of the lake and
ownership of the water itself? How much water should be
reserved for the Indians? Who should manage the local
irrigation project and power cooperative, originally built
for Indians but now serving mostly whites? How much water
should be allocated to farmers and ranchers, and how much
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should be left in the streams or rivers for fish and related
aquatic resources? Who owns the fish and wildlife, and who
should manage these resources?
Is there any merit to Hutchin's claim that the
reservation is becoming Montana's version of South Africa,
where a minority rules over a majority, and where the
majority has virtually no representation in government?
Some of these questions have been answered by
various courts, and, to date, judgements have generally
favored the tribes. For example, the Salish and Kootenai do
have the right to exclude non-tribal members from using
their land, or hunting their wildlife, or fishing their
waters.^ They also have the right to charge permits to nontribal members who want to use the reservation as a
recreational area, and they can set limits on its use.

2s
J

The so-called "Namen Decision" ruled that the tribes
have the right to regulate the bed and banks of their
portion of Flathead Lake; they can set limits on the size of
boathouses and docks, and can prohibit the manipulation of
the shoreline.^®
Other questions, such as who will manage aquatic
lands and streambeds on the reservation, or who will manage
the fish and game, are being debated, as the tribes have
assumed responsibility for these resources in early 1987.
Negotiations between state and tribal representatives are
underway. If cooperative agreements can't be reached, court
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court challenges will likely follow.
The Salish and Kootenai people face more than just
issues relating to natural resources and tribal
jurisdiction. According to Paro, they eventually need to
address the issue of continued blood quantum dilution due to
decades of inter-racial marriages. They need to continue
addressing the loss of Indian culture they've experienced.
How long, one might ask, can the Salish and Kootenai people
continue to maintain their dwindling cultural identity as
they live as a minority in their own homeland, a homeland
guaranteed to them?
The Salish and Kootenai have been successful. But,
as Therriault notes, that success has come at a tremendous
cost: the near-loss of their native languages and cultural
identity. To meet this challenge, cultural committees and
the staff at the local community college are doing what they
can to foster a rebirth in the tribes' traditions.
Nonetheless, the tribes' find themselves open to criticism
from people like County Commissioner Hutchin, who questions
whether many of the Salish and Kootenai Indians are Indians
at all.
In fact, about 30 percent of tribal members have
less than 1/4 Indian blood.^ Another 40 percent are between
1/4 and 1/2 Indian blood, meaning that about 70 percent of
the tribal membership have less than 1/2 Indian blood.
Given these pressures, it's not surprising that
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large-scale economic development, the kind that could bring
a large influx of whites on the reservation, is not a tribal
goal. For the same reasons, it is not surprising that the
Flathead tribes' self-determination activities of the 1970s
and 1980s, which clearly can be seen as survival tactics,
provide an example by which other tribes may follow.
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CHAPTER TWO

THE NATURAL RESOURCES:
WATER

Water resources
considered to be most valuable
on reservation
Water, especially Flathead Lake and River, is the
Salish and Kootenai people's most important resource, says
former Confederated Salish and Kootenai Natural Resource
Department Director Jim Paro.*
Even though questions of who owns the water, and who
will have the right to regulate its use, have yet to be
settled, the tribes derive significant monetary and non
monetary benefits from the reservation's relatively abundant
water resources.
Water is the life-blood of the Salish and Kootenai
Tribes' land: their forests, their range, their wildlife,
and their fish. It has tremendous scenic value in the form
of pristine high-mountain lakes, glaciers, waterfalls,
streams, rivers, and wet-land marshes.
The Salish and Kootenai can count 89 lakes on their
reservation.^ The biggest is Flathead Lake, of which about
60,000 acres, the southern half, is located within the
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reservation's exterior boundaries. There are also more than
460 miles of streams or rivers; the largest is the Flathead
River, flowing south out of Flathead Lake through the middle
of the reservation.^ It meets the Clark Fork River near
Paradise at the reservation's southwest corner.
Scenic, recreational, and ecological values of the
reservation's water resources are difficult to measure.
Consider subsistence deer hunting, for example. Water plays
an essential role in supporting this activity, a year-round
right to tribal members. Subsistence hunting puts a valuable
commodity, meat, in the freezer, but subsistence hunting is
also part of a traditional lifestyle many Indians hold as
priceless.^
Water is also a cornerstone in the tribes' growing
recreation and tourism efforts centered around Flathead
Lake, Flathead River, Ninepipe and Pablo national wildlife
ranges, the National Bison Range, and the Mission Mountain
Tribal Wilderness. The value of abundant and clean water to
plants and animals occupying these areas, and to human
visitors, is virtually impossible to measure.
However, the Salish and Kootenai Tribes believe that
people will be willing to pay to use their lands and waters
if they are maintained in a relatively pristine condition.*'
Indeed, many people are already paying to swim in or
waterski on Flathead Lake, to hunt waterfowl on the
reservation's wetlands, to fish its waters, or hike in
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wilderness drainages. Tribal regulations require all nonmembers to buy a permit if they want to do any of these
activities on tribal lands or waters.
There are problems, though. Enforcement has been
difficult. Wildland Recreation Department Director Herschel
Mays says that not everyone knows he or she is supposed to
buy a permit, and others who are familiar with the
regulations choose to ignore them.^ But according to Mays,
people have become more cooperative; in recent years, tribal
government has been able to raise about $100,000 annually
from permit sales, or twice as much than in 1979.
Starting in 1987, the tribes hope to have a new
permit system that will impose higher fees, carry a much
broader jurisdiction and will be enforceable through civil
actions in tribal court. Fish and Game Law Enforcement
officer Frank Acevedo says up to $300,000 will be raised
O
each year under the new system. 0 (These regulations, found
in tribal ordinance 44-D, will be discussed in Chapter 5).
Water is also important to farming and ranching. The
Flathead Irrigation and Power Project (FIPP), operated by
the federal government, provides irrigation to 2,600
customers, about 90 percent non-Indian, and 127,000 acres of
agricultural land within the reservation.^ FIPP has been the
subject of great controversy in recent years, as the Salish
and Kootenai are demanding that fish and aquatic resources
be protected by the establishment of minimum in-stream flows
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at the expense of irrigation needs.
Actions centered around the power division of FIPP
have also raised controversy. The Salish and Kootenai
Tribes, through the "638" contracting provisions of the
Indian Self Determination and Education Assistance Act, are
currently trying to secure the authority to manage the power
division of FIPP, which supplies electricity to about 20,000
people living on the reservation. The tribes were given
initial approval by the BIA in 1986, but that action has
been challenged in court by opponents who object to Indian
control over non-Indians.
Small-scale hydropower is also being developed. A
350-kilowatt dam on Boulder Creek in the northern Mission
Mountains was recently built and financed by the tribes.
Tribal economist Ron Trosper says the project is starting to
make money.*®

Other potential sites, such as Lower Crow

Creek, Post Creek, Dry Creek and Mission, have been
identified for their potential small-scale hydropower value,
although their proximity to the tribal wilderness may cause
management conflicts, and their economic potential is
unknown.**
Several potential hydropower facilities have been
proposed for the Flathead River. The most recent would have
dammed Buffalo Rapids below the existing Kerr Dam south of
Poison. In May 1986, the tribal council decided against
conducting feasibility studies for this proposed project.
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Ron Therriault, tribal chairman at the time, was quoted in
the tribal newspaper as saying: "Our prime question was, 'Do
we want to dramatically alter the river?' We answered 'No,
unanimously.'"* 2
Several months later in an interview, Therriault
said that, not only would the dam have "changed the nature
of things," it would have also been a poor business venture,
because it would have been many years before the tribes
would have seen any revenue.
Obviously, that view was not shared by the dam's
primary promoter Fred Houle Jr., a former tribal executive
secretary. According to Houle, the dam would have provided
jobs for hundreds of tribal members and long-term tribal and
Indian income. "The tribes need meaningful jobs that fit the
purpose of the reservation, which is to be a permanent
homeland," he said at the time the tribal council rejected
the plan.* 4
But councilman Vic Stinger of Pablo countered his
argument with what seems to typify the present conservative
nature tribal government has toward resource development and
environmental protection. According to Stinger: "If we
erred, we've done it correctly. The dam can still be built
in 20 or 30 years if there's a need."*^
A dam at Buffalo Rapids would have become the second
dam on the Flathead River. Kerr Dam, which began operating
in the early 1930s, is by far the most dominant water
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project on the reservation. It is also the tribes' biggest
money maker, although its economic value to the Salish and
Kootenai has only recently been realized.
This 180-megawatt facility is on 2,000 acres of
tribal land. Montana Power Co. (MPC) owns the dam and holds
the federal license to operate it. In 1984, after
threatening legal action that could have given the federal
license to the tribes, the Salish and Kootenai came to terms
with MPC over management of the dam through 2035. The
agreement provides the tribes with about $9 million annually
in rent payments, adjusted to inflation, for 30 years, and
then allows the tribes the option of buying out MPC's
interest in the dam and assuming management of the facility
for the final 20 years of the license.
That negotiated agreement came after battle dating
to the 1920s. When the original plans for the dam were first
revealed, a number of power sites were identified along the
Flathead River below Flathead Lake. These sites were seen by
the Montana Power Co. as having potential to supply
electricity for the Anaconda Company's mining and smelting
operations at Butte and Anaconda.*** They were also seen by
Indian advocates as the "cheapest imminent development in
the United States (and), "next to the Osage (Indians) oil
field and certain great timber stands, the most valuable
natural resource in Indian possession."*^
It was predicted that hydropower development of the

126

Flathead River could give the Flathead tribes "a large
permanent income" and "self-supporting jobs" near their
homes.*® That prediction, only now beginning to come true,
was made more than five decades ago.
Tribal officials were clearly pleased when the MPC
settlement was announced. On Oct. 6, 1984, Teresa Wall, a
tribal attorney during the MPC negotiations, was quoted in
the Missoulian as saying the settlement was a "major victory
and a wonderful t h i n g . K e v i n Howlett, a tribal
councilman at the time, said: "What happened . . . was kind
of like a dream come true."

oo

The 1984 agreement did dramatically increase the
tribes' compensation and set them apart from all other
Montana Indians. But tribal attorney Dan Decker says, in
retrospect, that the agreement with MPC only serves to
illustrate how the tribes were undercompensated throughout
n

the dam's first half century of existence.

*1

He notes that

part of the compromise the tribes made with MPC was that
they wouldn't ask MPC for retroactive payments, a point that
was acknowledged at the time by an MPC spokesman. The
Missoulian reported that MPC spokesman Dean Conklin said the
negotiated settlement was "forward-looking," because it
contained no retroactive payments."
Historical accounts support Decker's viewpoint, and
they indicate that the Salish and Kootenai were exploited
like other Indian tribes.

J

In 1926, the original plan for
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hydropower development at the Kerr site called for no
compensation to the tribes. A political struggle ensued,
pitting the tribes against utility interests, backed by the
powerful Anaconda Co. and the federal government. By 1930,
the tribes had won what was billed as a partial victory by
securing rent payments of $175,000 annually.
While that sum was considered reasonable at the
time, rent payments stayed at about that same level for
almost 40 years, ignoring inflation or growing MPC profits,
according to Wall. 2 4 By 1970, rental payments had been
increased to $240,000 annually. 2 ^ In 1978, two years after
the tribes had filed a request to assume control of the dam,
MPC agreed to boost its rental payments to $2.6 million
annually, retroactive to 1975. 2 ^ That's the amount the
tribes were paid through 1985, the first year of the most
recent MPC-Salish and Kootenai agreement.
The consequences of the current agreement are
impossible to ignore, as Kerr Dam is just beginning to live
up to its early predictions as a source of significant
tribal income. One immediate result of the Kerr Dam
settlement is that, with a guaranteed $9 million coming into
tribal government every year, the tribes no longer have to
depend on the volatile timber industry for the majority of
their revenue.
The nature of the tribal economy has changed, as the
reservation's forests no longer have the burden of raising
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the bulk of tribal income. Timber sales from the
reservation's 300,000 acres of commercial forests were once
as high as $5 million annually, accounting for as much as 90
77
percent of total tribal revenue in some years.
But not
anymore. In 1985, the first year of the MPC agreement,
tribal revenues were $12.5 million, with about $9 million
coming from MPC. Meanwhile, income from timber sales dropped
to under $1 million. 2 ®
While Kerr Dam provides an example of how water is
responsible (albeit indirectly) for significant tribal
income, perhaps the best way to measure the value of water
to the Salish and Kootenai people is by examining the degree
to which they will go to preserve water quality and quantity
on their reservation. In this regard, the tribes control the
bed and banks of their portion of Flathead Lake; they limit
the size of docks or boathouses built along the shore, and
they regulate shoreline modifications. Tribal government has
also established a 90,000-acre wilderness area, an action
that will help to protect water quality. And the tribes
recently adopted an ordinance that seeks to prohibit the
manipulation of all streambeds, riverbanks, and wetlands.
These actions (discussed in greater detail in
subsequent chapters) are consistent with tribal goals of
self-determination, preservation of the environment, and the
encouragment of recreation and tourism.
However, the ultimate test for the tribes — and all
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Montanans, especially western Montanans — may very well be
the maintenance of Flathead Lake as a clean and healthy body
of water. An environmental impact study in 1983 reported
that the quality of water throughout the Flathead Basin area
is generally excellent, including Flathead Lake. 2 ^ But water
quality is on the decline.
According to that report: "Conservation of water
quality in Flathead Lake presents the greatest management
dilemma (in the Flathead Basin), with federal, state,
provincial, tribal, county, municipal and private land-use
decisions in the upper Flathead drainage all influencing
conditions downstream. Although a multitude of regulations
govern local land uses and water quality impacts, no agency
is specifically charged with conserving water quality or
monitoring the cumulative effects of land uses on Flathead
waters.
Already the lake is showing signs of stress.

O 1A

Algea

blooms, a sign of nutrient-loading and excessive
eutrophication, are being recorded in greater numbers each
summer. Timber harvesting practices (road building and tree
skidding, for example), fertilizer from agricultural lands,
inadequate city sewage treatment facilities, and improper
septic systems are speeding the rate of eutrophication.
The tribes, like other agencies or organizations
involved, are playing an important role in addressing these
problems, problems that will only be solved through
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cooperative management.^ Tribal and BIA research on
quantification of streams, ponds, and lakes, water use,
fisheries, wildlife, and waterfowl is being conducted
throughout the reservation. In addition, the tribes
financially support the work of the University of Montana
Biological Research Station at Yellow Bay.
But the Salish and Kootenai Tribes could do more.
They could become the leading voice for a clean Flathead
Lake.
Tribal attorney Dan Decker believes the tribes,
through the strength of their treaty, may have the strongest
legal claim to clean water of all people in the Flathead
River basin. The U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the Namen
Decision, had this to say about non-Indian development
efforts along the shoreline of Flathead Lake: "Such conduct,
if unregulated, could increase water pollution, damage the
ecology of the lake, interfere with treaty fishing rights,
or otherwise harm the lake, which is one of the most
important tribal resources."^
Those are powerful words. They show the U.S. Supreme
Court recognizes the lake is vital to the tribes, and they
have a superior say over the lake's biological condition.
This legal clout could be used to apply pressure upstream in
the Kalispell, Bigfork, Whitefish, and Columbia Falls areas,
where a growing population is adding significant
environmental pressures on the lake. Decker says, "Things

131

like (the) Namen (Decision) help us to make assertions.
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CHAPTER THREE

THE NATURAL RESOURCES:
TIMBER

Timber resource:
the long-time economic asset

Steady revenues from Kerr Dam have lessened tribal
demand on its vast timber resources. They have also allowed
the tribes to express a growing displeasure over what some
tribal leaders feel has been a historic abuse of the
reservation's timber resources.
With millions of dollars coming in annually from
Kerr Dam, the tribes can now, for the first time, afford to
reduce pressure on their forests and pursue goals more
compatible with esthetics, recreation, and a clean
environment.
But perhaps even more important, according to tribal
economist Ron Trosper, is that the tribes have become less
dependent upon the federal government, which manages forests
on this and all reservations. 1 Forest management is one of
the few so-called "trust responsibilities" — obligations
the federal government has to Indians — that both Indians
and federal government officials agree upon.
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The Flathead Reservation's forest resources are
| considered among the most studied, developed, and managed
i
1 Indian forest holdings in the West, dating back to the
establishment of the reservation itself.

A review of this

u~
history, with a look at widely changing federal policy and
economic conditions, helps to reveal why some tribal leaders
today are disenchanted with the practice of forestry as they
have come to view it from their experiences with the BIA.
Some tribal members, like Salish and Kootenai tribal
(water quality manager Thomas "Bearhead" Swaney, say that

j
|Indians did just fine managing their forests before the
I white man moved in. 3 It's only been since then that there
have been problems. Swaney says he hasn't much use for
foresters: "A forester's motto is 'Black is beautiful; burn
it, and pave the sucker." 4 Tribal official Jim Paro explains
why people like Swaney believe as they do: "In the old days,
it was rape the forests and get the revenues," even though
that policy was generally supported by tribal government
until the 1970s and early 1980s.^
The experiences of the past have led the Salish and
Kootenai Tribes to an environmental movement of their own,
albeit that movement is coming a decade after the national
environmental movement, Paro says. The tribes, he says, are
now looking at a more balanced approach to forest management
than in the past. Water quality, recreation, wilderness, and
t—
wildlife are now being emphasized instead of timber
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production.
The most extensive historical account of the
reservations' forest practices was published by Historical
Research Associates (HRA), a Missoula organization, in
1977.^ It reveals early practices of hygrading, when only
the best trees were selected from the forest, leaving the
genetically inferior trees to reproduce. Outbreaks of the
forest disease dwarf mistletoe, which affect more than onethird of the reservation's Douglas fir, larch and lodgepole
pine forests, can be traced to those poor forest practices
of the past. 7
The HRA report also reveals constantly changing
federal policies and varying harvest rates, providing the
tribes with a valuable resource, but one that never provided
a stable income. For the first 45 years of the reservation
to the year 1900, timber activity was minimal, as the area
remained relatively wild and uninhabited. The Catholic
church built a mill in 1856 at St. Ignatius, and the federal
government followed with two mills of its own: one at its
Indian agency headquarters on the Jocko River, near what is
now Arlee, and the other at a sub-agency office near Ronan.
The purpose of these mills was to provide materials
to Indians who were developing farms. "When finished lumber
was required, the Indians hauled logs to the government
sawmills. . . Trespass was not a problem, and commercial
O
logging was still in the future," the HRA report states.
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But the turn of the century brought many changes to the
Salish and Kootenai people and their lands. The government
began enrolling Indians on the reservation in 1902 in
anticipation of an allotment policy that would be adopted by
Congress two years later. Each Indian received either 80
acres of farmland or 160 acres of grazing land, in keeping
with the federal government's national Indian policy of
assimilation under the Dawes Act of 1887.
On April 1, 1910, the Flathead reservation was
officially opened to homesteaders. After reserves were set
aside for timber, townsites, future allotments and the bison
sanctuary, nearly all — approximately 1.1 million acres of
the reservation's total 1.2 million acres — became
available to new settlers. Through subsequent legislation
and an aggressive buy-back program, the tribes have since
regained control to about half of their land. During the
years that the Dawes Act was in effect, most of the forest
lands were neither alloted to Indians nor homesteaded to
whites. These lands and the forests upon them were to be
managed by the federal government until they were disposed
of under the Dawes Act. Proceeds from timber sales typically
went to federal government accounts with the understanding
that they would help support federal Indian policy.
An estimated 38 million board feet of timber was cut
on the reservation prior to 1917.

Q

But it was in that year,

with a much-improved timber market and increased demands due
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to World War I, as well as a growing western Montana
population, which propelled the reservation into 14 years of
its heaviest forestry activity ever.
The year 1917 saw more than 19 million board feet of
timber removed from the reservation. 1 0 The following year,
almost 57 million board feet were cut.*^ Timber harvesting
peaked in 1923^jatien.jveariy—71 million board foet^were
cut.*^ The pace continued through 1930, when the nation fell
into a decade of economic depression.
The 1930s brought the Civilian Conservation Corps
(CCC) and the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of
1934. Both significantly affected forestry practices on the
reservation. While the CCC was building roads, trails, and
working on water development projects in the reservation's
forests, the Indian Reorganization Act redefined federal
Indian policy by allowing Indians to establish federally
recognized constitutions and governing bodies. It also
marked the end of allotment policy and closed reservation's
to further homesteading. Much of the unalloted forest lands
were returned to the tribes.
But perhaps even more significant was that the
Indian Reorganization Act directed the Departmpnt- nf
Interior to manage Indian lands on a sustained-yield
• laasis. 1 3 By 1945, the BIA had written its first management
plan for the forests of the Flathead Reservation. That plan
said cutting had been far too extensive for sustained yield.
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It predicted that the reservation, which had yielded an
average of 24 million board feet annually between 1911 and
1944, would run out of wood by 1962.^ To delay what the BIA
seemed to think was inevitable, it set an allowable cut of
10 million board feet per year which would, as predicted,
extend logging operations on the reservation through 1988.
The goal of limiting annual harvest to 10 million
board feet was never achieved, due to an increased demand
for wood products during World War II years, a booming
housing market that followed the war, and problems
associated with a government agency managing a private
forest. While the government was telling the tribes to cut
less, the tribes were asking to cut more. They needed
1 R

revenue and jobs.

'

J

~

Allowable cuts were modified in the 1955 to 26
million board feet for the following year, 20 million board
feet for the next few succeeding years, and eventually
stabilizing at 10 million board feet. That goal was also
never achieved. In the early 1960s, a new inventory of
forest resources was conducted, resulting in the 1962 Forest
Management Plan. Forest reserves were estimated at this time
to be much larger than before, and in a remarkable turn
around, the BIA increased allowable harvest to 71 million
board feet. In 1968, the allowable cut was set even higher,
at 76 million board feet, and nearly that amount of wood was
removed that year from the reservation.^
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As intensive forestry practices increased in the
1960s and 1970s, the tribes were able to raise more and more
money from timber sales. Revenue went over the $1 million a
year mark in 1966 and continued to bring in at least $1
million every year through 1984.^ About 300 million board
feet were cut between 1970 and 1975, raising $18 million in
revenue. And since 1975, the BIA reports the following
statistics:
— Between 1975 and 1984, timber sales totaled $28.7
million despite a recession in the early 1980s.

1 ft

— During that same time, sales of other wood
products (logs, posts and poles, firewood, Christmas trees)
totaled $5.7 million.
— Forest-related employment from 1975 and 1984 paid
a total of $8.1 million in wages or salaries.^®
But times have changed; the wood product's industry
is evolving, and the affects of that change can be seen on
the reservation as well as all of Montana. The state's once
vast reserves of virgin, old-growth ponderosa pine, larch,
and Douglas fir are being replaced by younger and smaller
trees. Mills geared to process the large-diameter virgin
wood are becoming outdated.
To Montanans — including the Salish and Kootenai,
who have on occasion supplied up to 4 percent of the state's
total harvest — this means the number of jobs available in
forest industries will continue to decline as it has since
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the late 1970s, according to Charles Keegan, a University of
O1
Montana forest industries researcher.
The recession of the early 1980s, caused by high
interest rates and a near stand-still of the national
housing market, resulted in Montana's statewide woodproducts workforce dropping from an all-time high of 11,000
in 1978 and 1979 to about 7,500 in 1982. 2 2 Total income for
wood products workers dropped from $260 million to $170
million, measured in 1982 dollars, over the same period.
A corresponding break-down of figures for the
Flathead Reservation were not available, but BIA Forestry
Division Director Ken Dupuis says the recession placed a
significant burden on the tribes, who supply wood to their
own post and pole operation as well as to Plum Creek at
Pablo, Missoula White Pine Sash, and Flodine Lumber Co. at
Plains and Thompson Falls. 2 ^ Dupuis says Indian and nonIndian employment, and total harvest from reservation lands,
have decreased since the late 1970s. The reservation came
out of the wood product's recession in 1984, when the tribes
sold 34.9 million board feet for $5.2 million.
Keegan says the wood products industry will continue
to play a vital role in western Montana, where it accouts
for about half the region's economic base. But he predicts
changes — changes that are already under way and could
dramatically affect communities which rely heavily on the
wood products industry. 2 ^ For example, he says:
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— Mills are becoming more computerized, mechanized
and efficient, which often results in a declining demand for
labor.
— Large-log sawmills and plywood manufacturers are
finding it difficult to adapt to the smaller size of trees
available in the woods. These mills are more labor intensive
and may be phased out.
— Small-log sawmills, waferboard plants and pulp
and paper mills are more highly mechanized and less labor
intensive. They will be better suited to what's available
from the forest as Montana moves into the 21st century.
These changes will bring both good and bad news,
according to Keegan. On the bright side, he says, "You do
have an industry that is more competitive." Competitiveness
should create an industry that will be less suseptible to
dramatic swings in employment like Montana experienced
during the recession of the early 1980s. To meet new market
demands, the tribes' post and pole mill is now making deluxe
surburban fences. These fences use small-diameter lodgepole
pine and cater to a growing market in urban areas.
The bad news, however, is that some mills which are
not suited to the new state of the industry will have to re
adjust or close, although he predicts that the rate of
closures and lay-offs will decline in the coming years.
Meanwhile, with $9 million in annual revenue from Kerr Dam,
tribal leaders have de-emphasized timber production, and the

future of reservation-based wood products industries is
unclear.
Harvests in 1985 and 1986 were under 10 million
board feet each year and brought in less than $1 million
annually, the first time such timber revenues have fallen
below a seven-digit figure since 1965.

Allowable cut has

been reduced to 39 million board feet a year.
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The number

of forest acres classified as commercial has been reduced by
the tribal council from 330,000 to under 300,000.^ And
tribal government has virtually banned clearcutting.

?Q

Forestry practices on the Flathead Reservation,
where selective cuts (a form of uneven-age management) are
the rule, now are nearly opposite to those on nearby
national forest, where clearcutting (a form of even-age
management) is the common practice, according to Dupuis. In
addition to making a financial mistake (lost future income
from smaller and less efficient harvests, and from lost
growth potential), Dupuis warns that the tribes may be
making a silvicultural mistake as well. Clearcutting, common
on surrounding national forest lands, provides the best
treatment for dwarf mistletoe, a disease that has affected
portions of western Montana's forest land. While the tribes
allow some clearcutting as a silvicultural tool for
mistletoe-infected forests, Dupuis says more is needed.
For the most part, though, the tribes' current
direction toward forest management is following many of the
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suggestions offered in a 1974 environmental analysis by
several University of Montana professors.^® Clearcuts, when
allowed, are not as big; re-planting efforts have been
improved; watershed management is now being carried out, and
road closures within the reservation's forests reduce
hunting pressure on deer.^
However, the Salish and Kootenai have chosen to
ignore other parts of that 1974 assessment. The assessment,
for example, in making a pitch for "quality timber
management," warned against leaving portions of the
o9
reservation's forests unroaded and in a natural condition. *
"The economic loss to the tribes and other
individual would be irreversibly and irretrievably committed
if the unroaded areas were set aside as natural areas,"
according to the report.

"Over the long term, massive fuel

build up could lead to a high-intensity wildfire and result
in irreversible and irretrievable losses in wealth and
—
'
•«
a m e n i t i e s . T h e report said that "timber harvesting will
introduce greater diversity. . . . ^
However, intensive forest management with timber
production as a primary goal "doesn't square" with the
present notion of what a tribal homeland should be,
according to Jim Paro. Nevertheless, forest industries will
continue to play a role in what tribal government sees as a
growing and diversifying economy. Even with today's reduced
emphasis on timber, economist Trosper estimates that more
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than 200 Indians work in the woods each summer, supplying
local mills or the tribal post and pole operation with
timber. A significant number of Indians also fight fires on
various fire crews.
It is important to note that the present forest
management plan, drafted with the assistance of tribal
government, does not preclude timber harvesting. And it does
allow for some clearcutting when best suited to deal with
insect or disease. Its goals and objectives are admirable.
Among them:
— Developing, maintaining and enhancing commercial
forest lands in perpetuity by applying sound silvicultural
methods and economic principles to reforestation, growth and
harvesting of timber.
— The preservation of the forest in its natural
state whenever the tribal council determines that
recreational, cultural, esthetic or traditional values
represent the highest and best use of the land to the
tribes.
— To conduct forest management on a sustained yield
basis.
— To vigorously pursue the salvage of both dead and
near-dead trees whenever possible.
— Close roads when needed to protect wildlife
habitat and guard against arson, trespass and poaching.
— Continue collecting base-line data on vegetation
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types, wildlife, soils and hydrology.
The plan is another example of cooperative
management between the tribes and the federal government. It
seems to take into account the controversial nature of
forest planning — that professionals from various
disciplines disagree on best management, and that the forest
has value beyond timber. If the plan's goals are met, and if
the current tribal government's philosophy of environmental
protection continues, the Salish and Kootenai tribal forest
will meet the needs of a diverse constituency, and its worth
to the tribes will be measured beyond mere stumpage value.
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CHAPTER FOUR

THE NATURAL RESOURCES:
RECREATION

Recreation, tourism stand to gain
from tribal self-determination policies

The Flathead Indian Reservation's scenic beauty and
natural heritage are among western Montana's primary
economic assets.
The reservation's natural beauty, its good land and
moderate climate, and the opportunities for hunting and
fishing have brought nearly 16,000 whites to live among the
Indians on this 1.2-million acre reservation. No other
Montana Indian reservation has been such a draw to the white
man.^
History shows us, though, that whites learned long
ago how to "sell" the reservation's scenic beauty. And
they've done just that during the first part of the 20th
century, beginning with federal policy under the Dawes Act
which opened up Indian reservations to white settlement. One
good example came in 1915, when the federal government
advertised the sale of 905 "villa" lots around the southern
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shore of Flathead Lake at places like Big Arm, Wild Horse
Island, and Finley Point.

These lots were all within the

reservation's present boundaries, although maps and
documents erroneously indicated that the reservation had
ceased to exist. 3
The following description, as it appeared in
promotional literature, complete with a map, was published
on March 20 of that year by the Department of Interior:

Flathead Lake, Montana, is situated
near to and slightly southwest of Glacier
National Park, the region of eternal ice,
which may be reached by automobile from the
lake in about three hours. The lake is in a
valley 15 miles wide and 30 miles long,
between the ranges of the Rocky Mountains of
scenic beauty, whose slopes are covered with
fir, larch, and pine trees. The lake has an
area of about 360 square miles. The Flathead
National Forest lies north, west, and east of
the valley. The lake and streams abound in
fish, and hunting is excellent. The lake is
utilized for bathing, sailing, boating,
yachting, and several steamboats ply between
various towns on its borders. The shores are
well adapted for the erection of wharves.
The lands abutting the north half of
the lake were disposed of many years ago, and
numerous homes and fruit orchards have been
established thereon. The south half of the
lake is within the former Flathead Indian
Reservation. The climate is delightful, the
thermometer ranging from about zero to 75° to
80° above. Apples, pears, cherries, peaches,
and small fruits of the finest quality are
raised upon lands bordering he lake, many
without irrigation."
. . . These villa sites are not only
well adapted to summer villas for persons of
wealth but for permanent homes for persons of
moderate means and for fruit farming. Good
roads, adapted to automobile use, skirt the

153

shores of the lake. 4

While whites have shown an ability to use the
reservation's natural beauty and environmental attributes to
achieve their economic and political goals, it has been only
in recent years that tribal government has acted upon a
similar realization. Attracting the recreational or tourist
visitor have not been top tribal goals; in fact, they have
only surfaced as such in the past couple of years.^
The 1985 tribal comprehensive plan devotes just one
paragraph to the untapped recreational potential of the
reservation.^ It reports that the tribes have been
unsuccessful with their tourism efforts in the past, then
notes that the tribes do raise some revenue from recreation
permits sold to non-tribal members who use the Mission
Mountains, Flathead Lake, and Flathead River, or other
reservation property. There was no discussion of how the
tribes might improve the recreation program, encourage more
non-tribal members to purchase permits, or develop other
recreational opportunities.
The plan did, however, address the needs of the
approximately 70 Indian-owned services and retail businesses
on the reservation, many of which cater to the needs of
visitors.

These are part of an Indian private sector

involving about 150 businesses, not including farms or
ranches. While the plan noted that the Indian private sector
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was large on this reservation (most Montana reservations
have just a few Indian-owned businesses), it reported that
most of the businesses needed assistance in marketing,
O
management, and finance.
Tribal government did at one time experiment with a
couple of tourist enterprises: a resort/motel on Flathead
Lake at Blue Bay, and the spa/bathhouse at Hot Springs. But
these projects were plagued by problems shared by other
Montana Indian business ventures: poor planning,
mismanagement, and inadequate marketing.

Q

Like the Crow

Reservation's Sun Lodge on Interstate 90, all lost money and
eventually went broke.
Lately, though, the Salish and Kootenai have made
public efforts to draw visitors. They disseminate colorful
brochures describing the reservation's various recreational
advantages.They extend an open invitation to visitors.
They boast that the Mission Mountains are known as the "Alps
of America.

They encourage a visit to the 133-year-old

Catholic mission at St. Ignatius. And they note that the
reservation provides excellent opportunities for bird
hunting, fishing, boating, skiing, snowmobiling, and
backpacking.
The recent emphasis on recreation is more of a by
product of tribal self determination policies than the
result of direct action aimed at luring visitors to the
reservation. External forces have encouraged recreational
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development. Some of those forces include:
— The forest industries recession of the early
1980s, which illustrated the dangers of dependence on a
single industry.
— A growing understanding by Indians that tribes
which fail to assume control over their resources may lose
the authority to manage them. If Indians don't manage their
resources, some other agency will, and not necesarily
according to tribal goals.* 2 Since the reservation is
blessed with recreational resources, recreation management
is a logical function of tribal government.
— The white population is growing faster than the
Indian population. In 1980, Indians totaled 19.2 percent of
the reservation population; by 1985, Indians totaled about
16.6 percent.* 3 Environmental protection policies that limit
rapid development might "preserve a way of life that is
irreplaceable," according to a tribally commissioned air
quality study that recommended Class I air for the
reservation.* 4 Class I air is the highest standard under
federal law, generally reserved for national parks and
wilderness areas. As tribal leader Jim Paro says, "there
won't be any steel mills on the reservation."*^
— Montana in general has been suffering an economic
recession in just about all sectors of its economy, except
one: tourism and recreation, which seem to be growing
despite little promotional help from state government.*^
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Lake County, with economic development goals similar to the
tribes, reports that travel-related jobs in Montana
increased by 2,600 between 1979 and 1983.Travel
expenditures by all visitors totaled $814 million in 1983,
1 ft
up 9 percent since 1979. ° And travel industry income
(wages, salaries, profits, etc.) increased from $188 million
in 1979 to $204 million in 1983, up 9 percent.* 9
Meanwhile, internal forces acting upon the tribes,
all geared toward fulfilling self-determination goals as
well as raising revenue to counter Reagan administration
federal budget cuts, have also played a role in boosting
tribal interest in recreation and tourism. Among those
facters are:
— The settlement between the Montana Power Co. and
the tribes over operation of Kerr Dam. That agreement, which
assures the tribes about $9 million annually (adjusted to
inflation), relieved logging pressure on tribal forests and
is making it easier for the Salish and Kootenai to manage
their forests more for recreation and wildlife than timber.
— Court decisions have given the tribes control
over the bed and banks of the southern portion of Flathead
Lake as well as the tribes' land, fish, and wildlife

o n This means that the tribes have been able to

resources.

charge non-members a fee, in the form of a recreation
permit, if they want to use those resources. Recreational
permits raised about $100,000 in each of the past two years,
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1985 and 1986. 2 * Revenues are used to fund management.
— The designation of a 90,000-acre tribal
wilderness in the Mission Mountains meets a number of tribal
objectives: preservation of the scenic Mission Mountain
front, water quality maintenance, protection of certain
spiritual grounds, and the protection of wildlife, including
the grizzly bear. 2 2 But designation of these mountains as
wilderness, along with the establishment of the tribes'
Wildland Recreation Department, helps to ensure that the
reservation will continue to offer quality backcountry
experiences — experiences non-members pay for by purchasing
recreation permits. Wilderness use is expected to increase
in the coming years, as the availability of high-quality
wildlands diminishes, says Herschel Mays, who directs the
tribal Wildlands Recreation Department.
— Establishing the strictest air quality standards
possible under federal law and virtually banning unsightly
clearcuts. Each action makes a clear statement about current
tribal values.
The above factors have caused tribal leaders like
Therriault, Mays, and Paro to recognize the growing
importance of recreation and tourism to the tribes, as
their's and other leaders' views on conservation and
resource management are laying the foundation for a
reservation economy that will preserve and enhance present
recreational opportunities well into the next century.
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A look at two existing tribal programs, both aimed
at meeting tribal self-determination goals, serve as an
example. They show how the Salish and Kootenai are improving
recreation and tourism opportunities within the reservation,
while simultaneously meeting self-determination and economic
development goals.

Shoreline Protection
The controversial Namen Decision of 1982 allowed the
tribes to move ahead with their Shoreline Protection
ordinance, which is aimed at regulating the bed and banks of
the southern shores of Flathead Lake.
Current codes were adopted in 1983, when the tribes
opened their Shoreline Protection Office. 2 4 Directed by J.
Lloyd Jackson, this branch of tribal government has taken on
the responsibility of protecting tribal rights to the
portion of Flathead Lake that courts have recognized as
theirs.
Jackson says the primary tribal goal is, "to
maintain the shoreline as nature meant it to be."^ The
lake, according to Jackson, "is a natural resource that is
worth a lot of money. And we are going to take care of it."
Keeping the lake as esthetically pleasing as possible,
"instead of trashing it," will only help to encourage
quality recreational experiences for all who use this
resource, whites or Indians, he says.
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The tribes enacted the ordinance because they
believed the shoreline around the lake was in trouble due to
"increasing population and ever greater utilization" of the
shorelines, thereby decreasing the value of the shoreline
and lake. 2 ® According to the ordinance, "there exists an
immediate need to regulate such activities and manage the
shorelines so as to preserve and protect them and, to the
greatest extent possible, restore them to their original
?7
condition."*
To accomplish these goals, the tribes have, among
other regulations, taken the following actions:
— Established a seven-member Shoreline Protection
Board to carry out the provisions of the Shoreline
Protection ordinance. The tribes allow three non-members to
serve on the board, which has broad authority to issue
rules, regulations, standards, conduct hearings, and
authorize variances — all, of course, subject to the
oversight of the tribal council. Allowing non-Indians to
serve on the board helps enhance relationships between the
two races, especially since most of the people affected by
the Shoreline Protection Ordinance are white.
— Banned shoreline manipulation (landfills or
dredging, for example) without approval.
— Required shoreline owners to obtain building
permits for wharves, docks, or breakwaters, established set
back requirements for shoreline buildings, and limited how
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far docks can extend into the water. Plans for any shoreline
structures must meet specific tribal codes, and they
ultimately must be approved by the tribal council.
— Banned boathouses or garages below the lake's
high-water mark.
— Began a program of shoreline and recreation
management on the lake that usually places at least two
representatives of tribal government on the southern portion
of the lake each day in the summer months. These tribal
employees inspect the shoreline and construction activities,
check for damaged docks, check for recreation permits, and
mark hazards in the lake.
According to Jackson, fees and fines from this
program raise about $35,000 a year, which pay for 20 percent
of the tribes' cost to run the program. The ordinance has
jurisdiction over 1,343 lakefront property owners along 108
miles of shoreline. While it initially met with significant
opposition (it was challenged all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court), Jackson says all but about a dozen lakefront
property owners are now cooperating.

Wilderness Management
The Salish and Kootenai tribal government carries
out an ambitious plan for managing the reservation's
wildland resources, centered on the Mission Mountain Tribal
Wilderness.
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And while the tribe's wilderness holdings and
management is far from being lucrative, the wilderness
management program has become another example of the tribes
successfully managing one of their resources in a way that
is compatible with self-determination goals, helps preserve
tribal members' cultural connections to the land, yet
enhances the quality of life for all Monantans.
Herschel Mays likes to note that the Salish and
Kootenai were the first Indian tribes in the nation to
"intentionally and willingly" follow concepts of the 1964
Wilderness Act by declaring part of their land wilderness
and adopting a management program aimed at retaining the
land's pristine and wild values. Mays uses the words
"intentionally and willingly" because there have been Indian
wilderness areas before, but none resulting from tribal
actions.
Wilderness advocate Bob Marshall, when he was in
charge of forestry on Indian lands, championed the idea of
OO

managing some of those lands as wilderness. ° And in 1937,
Secretary of Interior Harold Ickes designated a number of
"roadless and wild areas" within Indian country.

?Q

One of

those areas included 127,000 acres of the Mission Mountains
on the Flathead Indian Reservation. 3 ®
The government order calling for roadless management
of the Missions was rescinded in 1958 at the request of the
tribes, which maintained that they could lose the potential
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to harvest a significant amount of timber. 3 * The tribes
feared the area might be included in a national wilderness
act that was being drafted in Congress.
But according to historical accounts, the tribes
were not opposed to wilderness. In fact, the tribes had
suggested that the area be managed as an Indian national
park as early as 1936.

Although nothing ever became of

that idea, the concept is intriguing. According to a 1936
press release:

It is planned to maintain the Park in
its pristine natural state. Roads will not be
built throughout the area. A complete system
of trails will be built, and some trails are
already constructed in this region. These
trails will, for the most part, follow old
Indian trails. . . .
Indian guides will be available to
conduct parties through the Park. The visitor
will be able to hire these guides by the day
or week, as suits his plans. For those who do
not wish a guide, special trips will be
outlined in advance and instructions
furnished on application.
Indians will be encouraged to camp
and live in the Park. Visitors will thus be
able to see and come to know them. . . . 3

In subsequent years, the tribes opposed efforts by
timber companies and the BIA to harvest trees from the
Mission "face," clearly visible from throughout the
valley. 3 4 However, the tribes came to see federal actions to
set regulations on the Mission Mountains as a violation of
their rights to do what they want with their land. Then in
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1975, the tribes declared the south and north forks of the
Jocko drainage as "tribal wild areas." That action was
followed in 1979 by establishing the present-day 90,000-acre
Mission Mountain Tribal Wilderness.
Mays also likes to point out that simply declaring
an area wilderness is one thing; drafting, adopting, and
implementing a management plan is another. The Salish and
Kootenai have done both.
Just as many managers of parks or wildernesses say
their jobs require more people management than resource
management, such is the case in the tribal wilderness, Mays
says. Although use of the wilderness is considered slight,
Mays says it grows each year, primarly as more people from
Missoula or Kalispell discover its diversity.
The tribal wilderness management plan is a 102-page
document that covers history, tribal goals, management
objectives, and specific policies, along with chapters on
the wilderness' vegetation, fish, wildlife, watershed, and
cultural resources. In drawing up the wilderness management
plan, the tribes sought help from the University of Montana
Wilderness Institute — showing tribal willingness to go off
the reservation for expertise.
The plan has been modeled after the 1964 Wilderness
Act, Mays says, but with certain exceptions. For example,
some motorized equipment is used in maintenance, although
the practice is discouraged. Highlights from the plan
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include:
— Requirements that non-tribal members purchase
recreation permits to use the wilderness. These are the same
recreational permits that non-tribal mambers must purchase
to use all Indian lands or waters. In 1986, recreational
permits cost $10 yearly, $6 for three days, or $3 per day.
This fee structure has been restructured as follows: $5
yearly for a recreational permit; $10 for a fishing stamp,
and $15 for a hunting stamp. It is hoped that the new fee
schedule will raise an additional $200,000 yearly.^
— Establishment of a 10,000-acre special management
area surrounding McDonald Peak for grizzly bears. A dozen or
more grizzlies congregate there each summer to feed on
ladybugs and army cutworm moths. The tribes close the area
to people from mid-summer through Oct. 1. The primary
concern is for the safety of people, as the area is popular
with backpackers, but the tribes say they also want to give
bears some peace and quiet for their own sake.
— The Mission Mountains have served as "a guide,
passage way, fortification and vision seeking grounds, as
well as a place to gather medicinal herbs, roots,

and a

place to hunt for food. . . ."36 under the management plan,
these values will be retained. It is possible, for example,
for a tribal member to kill a grizzly bear, provided it is
in the context of traditional religion and has been approved
by the tribal council. Generally, matters of spiritual and

165

cultural importance are guarded closely by the tribes. For
example, the wilderness management plan requires that
archaeological and historic sites remain undisturbed, and
the location of spiritual sites will not be disclosed.
— Management of the wilderness area is to be in
such a way as to preserve the primal nature of the land,
vegetation, and animals. One of the beauties of this
wilderness, Mays says, is that it has relatively few trails,
not many signs, and is diverse and rugged. People like to
visit it for these qualities, he says, and the management
plan prohibits major changes. No more trails can be built,
for example, although existing trails or bridges can and are
being improved.

By implementing these and other ordinances relating
to recreation and conservation, the Salish and Kootenai
Tribes have clearly stated their desire to manage the
reservation and its resources in such a way that will allow
them to determine their own destiny under self-determination
policy as well as preserve the natural environment.
Clean air, clean water, wildlife habitat, fisheries,
protection of shorelines and streambeds — all these have
become matters of tribal jurisdiction in recent years. By
setting up management programs that protect these resources,
the Salish and Kootenai are showing that they can govern
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themselves, raise money for management, and encourage highquality recreation opportunities. If the tribes win their
battle for self-determination, it appears that the real
winners will be all those who seek the Flathead Reservation
for recreational pursuits.
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CHAPTER FIVE

THE NATURAL RESOURCES:
WILDLIFE

Tribal government asserts control
over fish and game management

As the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes have
done with water, timber, and recreational resources, they
now are doing with their fish and wildlife: using them as
artillery in the battle for political self-determination.
The motivation behind tribal government's selfdetermination activities is simple: the belief that if the
Salish and Kootenai people don't manage their resources,
somebody else will — and not necessarily with tribal
interests in mind. This logic was used by tribal Wildland
Recreation Department Director Herschel Mays in explaining
why the tribes designated a portion of the Mission Mountains
as wilderness, adopted a management plan, and began
implementing that plan. And it was the same logic used by
tribal Shoreline Protection Office Director J. Lloyd Jackson
in explaining why the tribes took control of the bed and
banks of the southern portion of Flathead Lake. 2
The case of fish and wildlife management on the
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reservation is no different, according to tribal attorney
John Carter. 3 He says other Indian reservations have learned
the hard way, from bad experiences, that Indian governments
failing to assume responsibilites often have responsib
ilities taken away.
Montana's Crow Indians provide one example. The
Crow's fiscal and management performance was so poor in the
1970s that the federal government placed a Bureau of Indian
Affairs employee in charge of the day-to-day management of
tribal government from 1980 to 1986.^ And Wyoming's Wind
River Reservation provides an example specific to fish and
wildlife management. Carter says tribal factions on that
reservation were unable to come together behind a
comprehensive, reservation-wide hunting and fishing program,
so the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service intervened with a
program of its own. Fish and game policies were adopted
without tribal input; treaty rights were curtailed, hunting
for religious purposes was banned, and violations of law
became federal offenses instead of tribal offenses.^ The
federal government told the Indians, "We're going to do it
until you can do it yourselves," Carter says.
Allowing a similar scenerio to be played out on'the
Flathead Reservation would be a mistake for tribal members,
he says. As a result, the tribes' legal office has drafted a
new hunting and fishing ordinance.® Known as "44-D" of
tribal codes, this ordinance significantly broadens Indian

172

jurisdiction on the reservation and lays the foundation for
the tribes to eventually take over the lead role in fish and
wildlife management.
The ordinance, which details reservation-wide
hunting and fishing codes for both tribal members and nonmembers and sets a fee schedule for non-member licenses,
provides another example of Salish and Kootenai tribal
natural resource policy aimed at self-determination and
economic development.
Under the new codes, non-Indians will be required to
purchase licenses to hunt on all lands within the
reservation, regardless of whether the land is privately
owned, state-owned, or Indian-owned. In addition, nonIndians will also have to buy a recreational permit to use
Indian lands. Fees have been set at $5 for the recreational
permit, $15 for a hunting stamp, and $10 for a fishing
stamp. Violations of rules or regulations will be enforced
in tribal court through civil procedures, with fines of up
to $5,000.
According to tribal Fish and Game Conservation
Department officer Frank Acevedo, the new ordinance, with
its fee schedule, will raise up to $300,000 a year, and will
help fund fish, game, and recreation management programs on
the reservation. 7 Previously, a $10 per year recreation
permit was the only source of tribal revenue to come from
hunters or fishermen, and total revenue from those permits
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has been just $100,000.
Tribal motivation for 44-D is stated at the
beginning of the ordinance: "Tribal regulation and control
of hunting and fishing on Reservation lands and recreational
activities of non-members on trust status lands based on
sound management principles will protect and enhance Tribal
resources, thus ensuring that those rights guaranteed by the
United States Government shall survive and inure (accrue) to
O
the benefit of future generations." 0
The ordinance was approved in 1986 by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs. According to BIA wildlife biologist Jim
Claar, it is no longer a question of whether it will be
Q
adopted, but what form it will take. Claar describes 44-D
as "the basis for all fish and wildlife management on the
reservation" and says it is part of a course of federal and
tribal policy that will eventually result in the BIA turning
over its fish and wildlife management responsibilities to
the tribes.
"That's what self-determination is all about," he
says, adding that he believes the Salish and Kootenai have a
good chance at making these policies work. He says Salish
and Kootenai efforts in the realm of wildlife and natural
resource management are "as progressive or more progressive
than any other reservation."
However, the tribes' assumed authority over fish and
wildlife has placed them at direct odds with the state,
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which also assumes management authority over fish and game
on the reservation. Ordinance 44-D, which went into effect
April 1, 1987, may end up in court if the state follows
through with its threat to sue the tribes. 1 0
Questions that need to be resolved include:
— Will hunters and fishermen need to buy two sets
of licenses, one from the tribes and one from the state, to
hunt on the reservation?
— Will tribal hunting and fishing regulations apply
to all lands within the reservation, including lands owned
or managed by the state, or private lands that have passed
out of Indian ownership? Or will they apply only to Indian
lands? This question is critical, since the state owns the
Nipepipe Wildlife Management Area, a popular waterfowl
hunting area.
— How are hunters or fishermen going to deal with
two sets of regulations over the same resources? Will they
cooperate with two sets of game wardens?
— What court system will deal with violations,
tribal, state, or both?
In early 1987, both the state and the tribes were
getting ready for a battle over these issues. The state was
maintaining that tribal codes should only apply to tribal or
Indian lands; the tribes said they will apply to all
reservation lands. Until this issue is resolved, hunters or
fishermen will probably have to buy two sets of licenses
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($25 from the tribes, $35 from the state), and deal with two
sets of regulations.
Dialogue at a Feb. 9, 1987 public hearing at tribal
headquarters in Pablo indicated that the tribes and the
state may be in for a long struggle. The purpose of that
hearing was to let the public raise complaints, or ask
questions of tribal leaders regarding 44-D. A racially mixed
audience of about 75 people attended.
It was at this meeting when the state's objections
to 44-D were first publically raised. 1 1 An attorney from
Poison, who objected to 44-D, read portions of a letter
expressing concern over 44-D from state Department of Fish,
Wildlife and Parks Director James Flynn to the tribes.
Flynn, in this Feb. 3 correspondence, questioned
whether the tribes' new hunting and fishing codes were based
on science. According to Flynn, "A major concern of the
Department over the proposed hunting regulations is whether
they are based on specific biological information. Because
of this problem, we cannot speak with any certainty about
their (the regulations') potential effect on the wildlife
resource." 1 2
The tribes, meanwhile, responded that recent BIA and
tribal studies on the reservation's fish and wildlife
resources were adequate and that the new regulations were
based on good data. "We probably have better data than the
state ever dreamed of," according to tribal fisheries
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biologist Dave Cross, who said: "I would take issue with
that portion of the letter." 1 3
Some whites were sharply opposed to the new rules,
but others, like Jack Puckett of the Big Sky Upland Bird
Association from Missoula, encouraged the tribes to
implement 44-D. 1 ^ "We are glad the tribes are considering
doing some management on the land. We encourage you, and we
hope you make great progress," he said. Another Missoula
resident, Bob Lucas, describing himself as a 20-year
waterfowl hunter on the reservation, said he has noticed a
continuing depletion of habitat. He said that tribal
management activities would be supported by non-tribal
members, if the tribes could improve hunting. 1 ^
"If you can improve the opportunities, there's
plenty of people who will pay more (to hunt)," he said,
adding that the $25 for non-member licenses is not, in his
opinion, too high.
Meanwhile, tribal Vice Chairman Ron Therriault
firmly asserted the tribes' political position.^ He would
not comment directly on negotiations between the tribes and
the state. But what he did say shows the tribes' confidence
in their position: "We have a treaty with the United States
government, not the state of Montana.
"What we do not intend to do — as we have done in
the past — is to approach the negotiations from a
subservient position." He acknowledged that the tribes and
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the state "may end up with one hell of a fight."
The adoption of ordinance 44-D is part of a growing,
decade-old effort on the part of the tribes — with
assistance from the federal government and the University of
Montana — to manage their fish and wildlife resources.
In 1976, the tribes created the tribal Fish and Game
Conservation Office and staffed it with three officers, says
Acevedo, who now directs a staff of nine. Officers from this
department enforce tribal fish and game regulations, check
for recreation permits, and will play a central role in
seeing that provisions of 44-D are enforced.
In 1977, the tribes contracted with the federal
government to hire a wildlife biologist, their first, and
one of the first Indian staff biologists in the United
States. In 1978, two federal wildlife positions within the
BIA were established, after pressure was applied by the
tribes.
Claar, who was one of those first two BIA
biologists, says much of his work has been to help design
timber sales to minimize damage to wildlife habitat, and to
help mitigate other effects of development such as building
new roads. Surveys have also been conducted to determine
what species live where, and in what numbers.
The goals of his office include restoring and
preserving populations of native species: grizzly bears,
black bears, deer, elk, big horn sheep, and west-slope
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cutthroat trout, for example. He characterizes the overall
wildlife situation on the reservation as good. Unlike many
parts of Montana, the reservation is home to at least four
threatened or endangered species: peregrine falcon, bald
eagle, grizzly bear, and gray wolf, he says. And most of
reservation is adequately stocked with a variety of species,
he says.
"The general perception that the reservation is
devoid of wildlife is not true at all," Claar says, adding:
"It is inaccurate to say that the Indians have wiped out the
wildlife."
Claar admits that logging and roadbuilding in some
areas have diminished what he calls "habitat effectiveness"
and have allowed easy access for hunters. Some of those
areas are lacking in wildlife. But he maintains that hunting
pressure on the reservation, even though it is year-round,
is light — perhaps lighter per unit of area than off the
reservation. He says he is working on a study that will
assess hunting intensity on reservation lands versus nonreservation lands.
That the tribes regulate their members' hunting
activity is also contrary to general perception. But the
tribes do regulate hunting and fishing by tribal members,
both on the reservation and off the reservation on
traditional hunting grounds. Granted, restrictions are
minimal compared to state hunting and fishing codes. But
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Claar said current tribal codes seem to be working.
Acevedo admits that it has been difficult to
convince tribal members of the need to impose rules and
regulations on hunting and fishing. Many tribal members
believe they have a right to hunt as often as they want,
whenever they want, and on all parts of the reservation.
That may have been the case in the past, but it isn't any
more. The tribes have, in recent years, begun enforcing a
number of regulations and closures. Here are some examples
from 1986 codes:
— Females of big game species are not allowed to be
taken between Feb. 1 and Sept. 1.
— Big horn sheep hunting is prohibited.
— Hunting or trapping native cats is prohibited.
— The Ferry Basin Area, northwest of the National
Bison Range, is closed to elk hunting.
— Off-reservation moose hunting is generally
limited to one animal per tribal member per year, although
the tribal council can make exceptions for subsistence
purposes.
— Salmon fishing on Flathead Lake has been
prohibited.
— Trout fishing on the Flathead River between Kerr
Dam and the Clark Fork is catch-and-release only.
— Fishing on the Jocko River is restricted to
catch-and-release.
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These rules continue to be controversial, but
Acevedo says he believes tribal members are learning to
recognize the need for tribal government to manage its fish
and wildlife in a manner that will ensure tribal control as
well as survival of the reservation's natural heritage.
The tribes have been involved in other activities in
the realm of fish and wildlife management. All are geared to
the conservation of these resources and the maintenance of
the Flathead Indian Reservation as an environmentally clean
tribal homeland for the Salish and Kootenai people.
Another recent controversial tribal action, the
Aquatic Lands Conservation Ordinance, seeks to protect
wetlands, streambeds, and riverbanks, all of which are
important to fish and wildlife. It would replace county
conservation districts with a board of tribal and non-tribal
members who would be responsible to tribal council.
Like the the new hunting and fishing codes, the
tribes maintain that the Aquatic Lands Conservation
Ordinance applies to the entire reservation, regardless of
land ownership. State and county officials disagree, saying
tribal codes should only apply to tribal or Indian lands.
Negotiations between the county, state, and tribes were
underway in early 1987, but no immediate resolution to this
conflict was in sight.
Recently, the tribes and the BIA have taken steps to
rebuild populations of big horn sheep, which were
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reintroduced at various locations within the reservation.
Cooperative studies funded by the Bonneville Power
Administration on the affects of Kerr Dam on Canada geese
are ongoing. 1 8 Other cooperative efforts between the tribes,
BIA, and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service are aimed at
boosting native trout populations in tribal waters,
19
including some of the high-mountain lakes in the Missions. *
However, grizzly bears have become the most
controversial wildlife species on the reservation, and they
pose unique management problems for the entire Mission
Valley. Research has indicated that the combined density of
people, livestock, and bears on the west slope of the
Mission Mountains is probably unequaled in North America.
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Too many grizzlies die prematurely, often after an
encounter with people, Claar says. Some bears are poached;
some killed by ranchers who suffer losses of domestic
animals. And still others are killed after attacking a
human.
The current grizzly bear management plan recognizes
the precarious status of the grizzly.

pix

.
Habitat is being

lost to new subdivisions in the valley. The grizzly
population is on the decrease, and each bear — especially
the females — are important if the population is to
recover, the plan states. 2 2 To the tribes* credit, they've
protected an essential part of the grizzly habitat. The
Mission Mountain Tribal Wilderness provides a relatively
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safe haven for part of year: The tribes' wilderness
management plan allows for specific trail closures if
circumstances call for such a closure, and 10,000 acres of
the wilderness are closed to people for several weeks each
summer.
Critical grizzly habitat has been identified, and
the forest plan for the reservation call for special
consideration of the grizzly.

Some areas of the

reservation's commercial forest have been taken out of
commercial status by the tribal council, and forest
practices on remaining commercial stands are designed to
mitigate adverse effects of logging on grizzly bears.
If tribal and federal goals of grizzly survival are
to be achieved, a coordinated, cooperative management effort
on the part of the tribes, the BIA, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service, counties, and the state is needed. 2 ^ The
role of state and county subdivision laws, along with a
coordinated education effort aimed at teaching people how to
live with grizzlies, will play an increasingly important
role.
The Salish and Kootenai Tribes, with their treaty
rights to wildlife and growing authority over reservation
resources, have the chance to become the grizzly bear's
loudest and most vigorous advocate. Their cultural tie to
the bear is the longest and strongest, extending backwards
in time for centuries. But the Salish and Kootenai Tribes'
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link with the bear exists today and extends into the future,
too. Both the Indians and the bear are threatened by outside
forces. And it seems that if the Salish and Kootenai can
preserve grizzly populations, they will also be saving
themselves.
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CONCLUSION
A STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL,
A VISION FOR THE FUTURE

Salish and Kootenai progress
offers unique Indian example,
but other Montana tribes may not survive

Montanans need not go to Third World countries to
see pervasive poverty, widespread unemployment, unmanaged
resources, and underdeveloped governments. These problems,
as illustrated in this report, can be found, to varying
degrees, on all seven Montana Indian reservations.
Montana's Indians today, like all Indians in
America, are a product of their past, a result of more than
150 years of interaction with the dominant white society.
They are a product of the reservation system. Alcoholism
affects most Montana reservation families. Indian health is
significantly below the level of the general public; their
illnesses are more frequent and severe, and they die
younger. Unemployment ranges from 27 percent to 85 percent.
More than half of Montana's reservation Indians live beneath
the federal government's poverty line.
These problems, not limited to Indians in Montana,
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are certainly not new. Indian leaders, academic scholars,
writers, and politicians have long sought the solution to
the so-called "Indian problem." Interestingly, the dialogue
in Indian country today is much the same as it was 100 years
ago. Only specific policies have changed; sometimes they've
favored assimilation into the larger society, other times
they've recognized Indians' sovereign right to exist from
treaties. Only recently has there been an concerted effort
to mesh the two seemingly polar concepts.
That's good. But it won't be enough. The problems in
Indian country are too diverse and too complex. Inadequate
education, political instability, racial prejudice and
hostility, poor relations between Indian and non-Indian
governments, poverty, disease, inadequate land and resource
management, the need for continued federal aid: all these
issues have to be addressed, and in a comprehensive fashion.
Meanwhile, the dominant white society needs to recognize it
has a legal and moral obligation to uphold the treaties.
Montanans must acknowledge that this state's Indian
reservations are its developing nations; sovereigns within a
sovereign, governments unlike any other in the United
States. That is because Indians are different from any other
ethnic group in America. Right or wrong, like it or not,
Indians are special; they are the first Americans, and our
forefathers agreed to treaties, making Indians unique,
generations ago.
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Yet despite these treaties, Indians' continue to
fear "termination," the word used to describe the process of
treaty abrogation. In the 1950s, the federal government
eliminated federal recognition of more than 100 tribes or
bands of Indians. At the same time, the federal government
was relocating Indian families from reservations to big
cities, where Indians were placed in factory jobs to become
assimilated into the larger society. Both policies are
considered failures.
Today, termination is coming in the form of federal
budget cuts which have, during President Ronald Reagan's
first six years in office, forced the issue of selfdetermination. Tribal governments, which have taken on broad
responsibilities under self-determination policy, are being
forced to find other sources of income to meet the needs of
their people. The wealthier tribes — like those on the
Flathead and Fort Peck reservations — are finding ways to
adapt; the poor are not, and their survival is questionable.
Typically, tribes are finding that they must look
toward their natural resources for meeting the costs of
their growing governments. In Montana, coal, oil, gas,
hydropower, water, rangeland, and cropland are all being
looked at to fill the financial niche once occupied by the
federal government, which seems to be forcing Indians to
exploit their resources now and worry about future
generations later. The potential effect of this policy on
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the land and its people could be devastating.
Montana Indians have learned that merely having
natural resources does not provide economic security or the
preservation of a culture. Five of Montana's reservations —
Crow, Northern Cheyenne, Fort Peck, Blackfeet, and Flathead
— have significant natural resource bases. Yet only two,
the Flathead and Fort Peck, have been successful at turning
those resources into relatively strong tribal economies. And
only one, the Flathead, has gained financial stability.
For the others, economic and cultural survival will
be a difficult goal. Consider the following:
— Fort Belknap and Rocky Boy's Indians have
virtually no source of tribal revenue, small land bases, and
limited resources. Their hopes for the future depend on
agriculture and the hope of irrigation that may come with
the proposed major water diversion project that would link
the Missouri River with the Milk River. Since Fort Belknap
and Rocky Boy's reservations have no money, and federal aid
has dropped sharply, their hope for industrial development
is also slim. Wisely, both these reservations are
emphasizing culturally sensitive education. They talk of
developing their "human resources," since natural resources
are nonexistent or unmarketable. Their approach is good, but
success will require continued government assistance,
especially in education.
— Politics on the Blackfeet Reservation are called
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"cutthroat" and "unstable." Charges of nepotism within
tribal government surface frequently. The tribe usually
elects an all-new tribal council every two years, preventing
long-term planning and steady leadership or direction.
Recreation and tourism provide great opportunities for the
future; so does petroleum. The new alliance between white
environmentalists (the Badger Chapter) and Blackfeet
traditionalists over protection of the Badger-Two Medicine
area is facilitating a beneficial public debate in the media
of Indian religion, treaty rights and Forest Service policy.
Eventually, the interaction between the various groups
involved in the Badger-Two Medicine issue could lead to an
enlightened form of cooperative resource management between
the Forest Service and Blackfeet government, helping the
Blackfeet to further their self-determination efforts and
protecting their historic interest in the region. However,
the overall political instability on the Blackfeet
reservation makes it impossible to predict how long the
alliance between whites and Indians will stay together. The
bottom line on the Blackfeet Reservation is that the tribe
needs to come together politically if it wants to move
ahead.
— Crow Indians had their government taken away from
them in 1980. They got it back in 1986. But before they can
make much progress in economic development, they must prove
that they can deal with the most basic of governmental
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responsibilities: fiscal accountability. Their political
system, featuring a tribal council of all adult members who
meet four times a year, is plagued with political turmoil.
While it offers the purest form of democracy in Montana, and
perhaps in the entire United States, it must be changed. The
Crow version of democracy may have worked in another time
and under different circumstances, but it is outdated today
and seriously cripples the tribe's ability to compete in the
outside world.
— Annual tribal income on the Northern Cheyenne
ballooned into the millions earlier this decade, when Shell
Oil Co. entered into an exploration agreement with the
tribe. After seven dry wells, Shell pulled out. Today, with
most of the Shell money spent, the tribe is going broke and
tribal government is in disarray. In 1986, the Northern
Cheyenne elected their third tribal chairman in as many
years; they tossed out the two previous chairmen amid
charges of incompetence and corruption. On the resource
front, the Northern Cheyenne have repeatedly refused to
develop their coal, citing that they do not want to exploit
their land and that they want to keep bad influences —
crime, drugs, alcohol — off the reservation. Despite their
anti-development stance, alcoholism, stemming from poverty
and despair, affects nearly every family. The Northern
Cheyenne reservation situation illustrates the dilemma that
today's Indian leaders face: should they invite the outside
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world into their reservation at the potential risk of losing
their culture and resource base, or should they bar the door
and face continued poverty. Indians lose in either instance.
— Management skills, generally acquired off the
reservations, are lacking on most Montana reservations.
College-educated Indians say they are discriminated against
by their fellow Indians. Indians successful in business
report that they, too, are discriminated against. Indian
communities need to resolve these issues, for if they are to
achieve economic and political development, they cannot
remain entirely isolated from the realities of the outside
world.
— Montana's tribes are part of Montana, and when a
recession strikes Montana, it also strikes the reservations.
The crash in energy markets has hit the hardest, and those
tribes who became the most dependent on energy resources for
revenue have learned that exploiting oil, gas, or coal will
bring a bust just as sure as a boom.
However, the Montana Indian situation is not
entirely bleak, as illustrated by the Fort Peck and Flathead
reservations. For example, the Fort Peck tribes, with their
successful 500-employee tribal manufacturing plant at
Poplar, have kept unemployment levels under 50 percent. Like
the Flathead, they have become a role model among Indian
reservations by implementing strong planning efforts,
maintaining relative political stability and a commitment to
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education.
Together, Fort Peck's Assiniboine and Sioux and the
Flathead's Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes are this
state's most successful Indians. While this report clearly
sets them above the others, it recognizes that what may be
right for one reservation could prove fatal for another.
This report offers no single, grand solution to the "Indian
problem." Yet it is hoped that these two reservations — and
particularly the Flathead — can serve as examples not only
to other Montana Indians but to Montana's non-Indians, many
of whom could learn and benefit from a closer relationship
with this state's first residents.
Despite cultural differences (see appendix), the 500
miles between them, and their sharply contrasting land
bases, the Indians of the Fort Peck and Flathead
reservations share certain things in common. Both
reservations are inhabited by more than one tribe. Both
reservations have shown that, despite tribal differences,
their members have been able to work together toward common
goals. Both reservations are close to regional centers. Fort
Peck is surrounded by towns like Glasgow, Wolf Point,
Poplar, Scobey and Plentywood, and Williston, North Dakota
is not far away. The Flathead' Reservation is situated
between Missoula and Kalispell, and Poison is on the
reservation.
One can't help but notice something else: that these
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reservations are the two most heavily influenced by whites.
They are the only two Montana reservations where Indians
have become minorities.
The interaction between whites and Indians on these
two reservations has benefited the Indians. These two tribal
governments have a long history of dealing with the dominant
white society close-up. They seem to mesh more easily with
local, state, and federal governments. For instance, it
seems significant that Flathead and Fort Peck tribal leaders
expressed the fewest complaints regarding the BIA, while
tribal leaders on other reservations spoke of poor to
terrible relations with the BIA.
However, if interaction with whites has been a
significant reason for these reservations' successful
economies and governments, that success has come at a cost.
The Flathead reservation, the primary focus of this report,
provides the best example. For while the Flathead
reservation has perhaps gained the most of all Montana
reservations, both economically and politically, from living
with whites, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai as a
people have also paid the highest price for their success.
The first and most significant cost incurred by the
Salish and Kootenai was the loss of their lands due to turnof-the-century allotment policies. Nationwide, Indian lands
were reduced from about 156 million acres in 1881 to 47
million acres by 1933, when allotment policies were
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curtailed. On the Flathead, current tribal or individual
Indian holdings total about about 50 percent of the total
1.2 million reservation acres.
The economic costs of allotment policies can be
measured by comparing economic statistics of Indians to
whites who live on the same reservation. On the Flathead,
Indian unemployment of about 27 percent is two to three
times that of non-Indians. And in just about all other
socio-economic categories — annual earnings, poverty,
education, health — Salish and Kootenai tribal members come
up short compared to their white neighbors.
The cultural effects of living closely with whites
have also been significant. The Salish and Kootenai have
experienced a significant dilution of their Indian blood,
perhaps the most of all Montana tribes. Inter-racial
marriages have created families where some children are
tribal members and others are not. Tribal leaders report a
near loss of native language and culture — in essense,
ethnic identity.
But, to the credit of current Salish and Kootenai
tribal leadership, the Indians of the Flathead are not
looking back. While recognizing the importance of Native
history and culture, they seem to recognize that it will do
them no good to speak their language if in the end they lose
control of their reservation in court, where the Indian
battles of today are fought in English.

196

Times have changed. Resources are getting scarce.
And Indians, if they want to survive, will have to show that
they can function in a modern world. That means they must
establish governments that can deal effectively and
professionally with local, state, and federal jurisdictions.
It means they must risk interaction with the outside world.
It means that Indian education, whether in Indian-run or
state-run schools, must be culturally sensitive to the needs
of Indian youths. The question remains whether Montana's
Indians can figure how to have it all: political selfdetermination, economic self-sufficiency, the ability to
mesh with the dominant white society, yet at the same time
retain their unique cultural identity.
From an economic perspective, the Salish and
Kootenai are pursuing three important conditions for
development: control, capital, and management. Their present
policies seek to get control of resources, raise capital by
making deals with outside organizations or agencies, and
provide for tribal management of resources once control is
gained. These three concepts are linked. With no capital,
it's tough to gain control of resources. Without control of
resources, management becomes a moot point. On the Flathead,
capital is no longer in short supply due to the Kerr Dam
agreement, and tribal government has the financial ability
to move ahead in efforts to gain control of resources and
begin managing them.
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Clearly, the Salish and Kootenai are off to a good,
albeit late, start in their drive for self determination.
They've shown with their Kerr Dam settlement that Indians
can make lucrative, long-term deals with non-Indian
interests on their own behalf. They've shown with their
Shoreline Protection Office and Wildland Recreation
Department that they can manage popular recreational
resources that are used primarly by non-Indians. They've
shown by creating racially mixed advisory boards that they
are willing to be good neighbors, but at the same time,
they've shown that Montanans can expect them to assert what
they believe are their treaty rights.
Salish and Kootenai Tribes' motivation is obvious:
survival — political, economic, and cultural. While tribal
leaders can accurately and honestly speak of spiritual ties
to the land, they also recognize that Indians have become a
significant minority on their own reservation, and that
environmental regulations, by limiting population growth on
the reservation, can be the means to the ends which they
seek.
Whites outnumber Indians on the reservation by a
ratio of about four to one. The last thing the Salish and
Kootenai need is an oil boom, a manufacturing plant, or a
pulp mill, each with the capacity to bring several hundred
white workers and their families to the reservation. Should
the Flatheads become more outnumbered by whites than they
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are now, the result could be their ultimate defeat. Clearly,
what's needed, from the tribes' perspective, are minimumimpact, clean industries like tourism and recreation, or the
tribally owned electronics manufacturing plant.
Tribal policies that limit growth may appear to many
— both Indians and non-Indians — to run against the best
interest of all who live in the Flathead Valley, where jobs
are at a premium. Perhaps these critics are right, but if
so, they are looking at the issue from a short-term
perspective.
Current tribal policy looks beyond the immediate
five years and on into the next century. Tribal leaders have
a long-term perspective that seems to buck the convential
wisdom of the benefits of growth for growth's sake.
In doing so, the Salish and Kootenai are confirming
their place in Montana and the world, as well as making a
special promise to Montanans and others who will have the
opportunity to visit their land. With each of their new
resource management ordinances, together with their overall
philosophy of controlled economic development, the Salish
and Kootenai have said they will protect and enhance the
environment of their reservation. They're betting that these
policies will preserve their land and culture and, in the
process, provide long-term economic stability.
The Salish and Kootenai have chosen a path that will
likely prohibit resource exploitation or industrial growth
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in favor of a cource of action that is based on a philosophy
which puts environmental protection and regulation at the
foundation of economic development policy. Only time will
tell whether their approach is right. Certainly, as the
Flathead Indian Reservation moves into the next century, it
will provide an excellent case study in Indian policy, selfdetermination, and economic development.
More important to watch, though, is the immediate
and growing role the Salish and Kootenai play in shaping
economic, environmental, and political actions in western
Montana. The Salish and Kootenai can, in certain arenas,
pack an environmental punch unmatched elsewhere in western
Montana. Their treaty with the federal government ensures
them control over many of the reservation's natural
resources. They own about 600,000 acres of the Misson
Valley, including 300,000 acres of commercial forest and
90,000 acres of wilderness. They own the bed and banks of
the southern portion of Flathead Lake. They have exclusive
rights to fish and wildlife.
If tribal actions taken in 1986 and 1987 are either
left unchallenged or are ultimately upheld by courts, the
Salish and Kootenai will control all wetlands, streambeds,
and riverbanks within the reservation, regardless of
ownership. They will require minimum stream-flows for fish
and other aquatic animals. They will manage the local power
cooperative. They will manage fish and game. If the Salish
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and Kootenai maintain their momentum, the future will see
even more Indian control on the reservation. Already Indian
leaders are talking about reservation-wide land-use planning
and zoning.
What the Salish and Kootenai do with their resources
will shape the future of not only their reservation, but the
entire Flathead Valley, and, to some degree, the state of
Montana. Given the necessity for the tribes' environmental
ethic and the potential strength of that ethic, the winner
could be the land itself, which in turn provides the basis
for long term economic stability and a tribal conservation
strategy of sustained development.
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APPENDIX

Profile of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation
The People; The Blackfeet Indian descended from three
tribes of northern Great Plains: the North Peigans,
the "Blackfeet" (South Peigans), and the "Kainai"
or Bloods. All three spoke a common language. In the
1700s, the Blackfeet Nation numbered more than
15,000 and lived on both sides of what was to become
the Canada-United States border. They were the
largest and most dominant tribes in Montana, but
wars and diseases (smallpox, for example) that
followed the white man West diminished Blackfeet
population to about 2,000 by 1885. Montana's
Blackfeet still retain ties with relatives who
live in Canada.
The Land: The reservation encircles 1.5 million acres just
west of Glacier National Park. The first treaties
with the Blackfeet were in the mid-1800s and
recognized more than half of Montana as Blackfeet
territory. Most of this land was subsequently
taken away from the Blackfeet, often with no
compensation. Tribal boundaries in the late 1800s
included the eastern portion of what is now Glacier
National Park as well as the the unit of land called
Badger-Two Medicine. The Dawes Act of 1887 was
applied to the reservation in 1907. Each Indian
was alloted 320 acres. Remaining land was opened
to white settlement.
Portion Owned by Tribe or Individual Indians: about
61 percent.
Tribal Membership: about 12,700.
Resident Blackfeet Population: about 5,525.
Total Reservation Population: about 6,660.
Whites on Reservation: 1,135.
Tribal Unemployment Rate: 36 percent (BIA 1985);
tribal government reported 80 percent in 1986.
Blackfeet Living in Poverty: 39 percent (1980 Census); tribe
reported 60 percent in 1986.
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Approximate Tribal Revenue: $6 million (1985), about
60 percent coming from oil and gas revenues. Falling
energy prices were expected to reduce tribal
revenue by more than $2 million in 1986.

** *

Profile of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation
The People: Fort Peck Indian Reservation is home to two
tribes, Assiniboine and Sioux. The Assiniboine of
Fort Peck are related to the Assiniboine of Fort
Belknap Reservation. Both were once part of the same
tribe, but from different bands, and have called
northern Montana home for 200 years. Fort Peck's
Sioux descended from people who were forced from
homelands in Minnesota in the 1850s. They moved
west to the Dakotas and eastern Montana. Together
with the Northern Cheyenne, the Sioux defeated Gen.
George Custer at the Battle of the Little Big Horn
in 1876. After the fight, some Sioux began settling
in the Fort Peck area. Treaties with the Assiniboine
and Sioux, setting up the reservation as it is known
today, were signed in 1886.
The Land: The Fort Peck Reservation was once part of a large
common hunting ground shared by several tribes,
including the Assiniboine. Congressional action in
1888 established the present reservation boundaries,
encompassing about 2.1 million acres of rolling
prairie north of the Missouri River between
Porcupine and Muddy creeks. The reservation was
opened for white settlement in 1908.
Portion Owned by Tribes or Individual Indians:
about 45 percent.
Tribal Membership: about 8,500.
Resident Assiniboine and Sioux: about 4,500.
Total Reservation Population: about 10,000.
Number of Whites Living on Reservation: about 5,500.
Tribal Unemployment Rate: about 40 percent (BIA 1985);
tribal government reports same for 1986.
Percentage of Assiniboine and Sioux Living in Poverty:
42 percent (1980 Census); tribe reports 35 percent
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in 1986.
Tribal Budget; Tribal revenue figures were not made
available. However, the tribal budget for 1986 was
estimated at between $2 million and $3 million, a
drop of about $2 million from 1985.

***

Profile of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation
The People: The Assiniboine (Stone Cook) and Gros Ventre
(Big Belly) tribes, once enemies, share the Fort
Belknap Reservation. They were given their names by
early French explorers. The Assinboine prefer
"Nakota," meaning "the people," while the Gros
Ventre prefer "A'aninin" meaning "white clay
people." Both moved independently onto the plains
from the Great Lakes region more than two
centuries ago.
The Land: Both tribes once shared the huge common hunting
grounds which encompassed half of Montana.
Today, the reservation covers 653,938 acres of
mostly dry farm and range land south of the Milk
River to the Little Rocky Mountains, which, until
gold was discovered, were part of the reservation.
Portion Owned by Tribes or Individual Indians: 95 percent.
Tribal Membership: About 4,200.
Total Reservation Population: about 2,100.

Total Indian Population: about 1,900. Four neighboring
towns — Harlem, Dodson, Malta and Chinook — are
home to about 400 more tribal members.
Number of Whites Living on Reservation: about 200.
Tribal Unemployment Rate: about 78 percent (BIA, 1985);
tribal government reports same in 1986.
Percentage of Assiniboine and Sioux Living in Poverty:
47 percent (1980 Census); tribes report 66 percent
in 1986.
Approximate Tribal Revenue, 1985: about $500,000,
mostly from land leases.
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Profile of the Rocky Boy's Indian Reservation
The People: The Chippewa-Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's
Reservation are descendents of two tribes with roots
in the Great Lakes region. They found themselves
displaced and homeless in Montana before the turn
of the century. Little Bear, chief of the Cree band,
and Stone Child, chief of the Chippewa band, joined
forces in seeking a reservation for their people.
They succeeded in 1916, when the reservation was
established by executive order. The reservation is
named in honor of Stone Child, who name was
erroneously translated by whites into Rocky Boy.
The Land: By far the smallest Montana Indian Reservation, it
extends from the Bear Paw Mountains northwest onto
the plains near Havre. The original reservation was
55,000 acres of the old Fort Assiniboine Military
Reservation. Subsequent additions doubled the size
of the reservation to today's 108,000 acres.
Portion Owned by the Tribe or Individual Indians: Virtually
all of it, since it was never opened to white
settlement under the Dawes Act.
Tribal Membership: about 3,300.
Resident Chippewa-Cree Population: about 2,000.
Total Reservation Population: about 2,170.
Number of Whites Living on Reservation: Very few.
Tribal Unemployment Rate: 70 percent (BIA 1985); tribal
government reports 85 percent in 1986.
Percent of Chippewa-Cree Living in Poverty:
40 percent (1980 Census); tribe reports more than
50 percent in 1986.
Approximate Tribal Revenue, 1985: about $300,000, mostly
from land leases and oil and gas revenues. With
energy market down, 1986 revenue was expected
to be about $200,000.
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Profile of the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation
The People: The Northern Cheyenne call themselves the
"Morning Star People" in honor of Chief Dull Knife,
also known as Morning Star. Like many of the Plains
tribes, the Cheyenne are believed to have originally
lived in the Great Lakes region and subsequently
moved west. The Cheyenne were living in the Black
Hills when encountered by Lewis and Clark in 1804,
and are believed to have moved to Montana 20 or 30
years later. They split into northern and southern
groups, with the larger tribe moving south. Together
with the Sioux, the Northern Cheyenne defeated
Custer at the Battle of the Little Big Horn in 1876.
After unsuccessfully trying to force the Northern
Cheyenne to live with their distant relatives the
Southern Cheyenne in Oklahoma, a reservation along
Montana's Tongue River was established in 1884. It
was enlarged to its present size in 1900.
The Land: 444,157 acres of range and forest lands just east
of the Crow Indian Reservation in southeast Montana.
Portion Owned by Tribe or Individual Indians:
about 98 percent.
Tribal Membership: about 3,600.
Resident Cheyenne Population: about 3,100.
Total Reservation Population: about 3,600.
Number of Whites Living on the Reservation: about 500.
Tribal Unemployment Rate: 60 percent (BIA 1985).
Percentage of Cheyenne Living in Poverty: 45 percent (1980
Census); tribe reports over 50 percent in 1986.

***

Profile of the Crow Indian Reservation
The People: The Crows' roots are in the Great Lakes region.
They are believed to have arrived in Montana around
1600. Trading began with whites in the early 1800s.
A treaty of friendship was signed between the tribe
and the federal government in 1825. Relations
between the government and Crows have historically
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been good. In fact, Crow scouts aided the U.S.
Cavalry in several regional battles, including the
infamous Battle of Little Big Horn.
The Land: The Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 established a
reservation of more than 37 million acres in
southeastern Montana and northeastern Wyoming.
Subsequent treaties reduced the reservation to
its present size of 2.2 million acres.
Allotment opened the reservation to white
settlement, further reducing Indian holdings.
Nevertheless, it remains Montana's largest
Indian reservation.
Portion owned by Tribe or Individual Indians:
about 78 percent. The tribe retains mineral rights
to 1.1 million acres of coal-rich rangeland just
north of the reservation.
Resident Crow Population: about 4,000.
Tribal Membership: about 7,000.
Total Reservation Population: about 6,000.
Number of Whites Living on Reservation: about 2,000.
Tribal Unemployment Rate: 57 percent (BIA 1985);
tribal government reported 85 percent in 1986.
Percentage of Crow Living in Poverty: 34 percent
(1980 Census); tribe reported 97 percent of all
households received some form of welfare in 1986.

•••
Profile of the Flathead Indian Reservation

The People: The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes are
descendents of several tribes, including the Pend
d'Oreille, Kalispel, Spokane, Salish, and Kootenai.
Unlike Montana's other tribes, with historic roots
in the upper Midwest or Canada, the Flatheads'
roots are in the Pacific Coast region. They are
believed to be the state's first residents, having
moved to the valleys of western Montana perhaps
as long ago as 5,000 B.C.
The Land: The Treaty of Hell Gate in 1855 established a
reservation that encompassed the Bitterroot and
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Flathead valleys. In 1872, Indians living in the
Bitterroot were ordered to the Flathead Valley. A
band of hold-outs were forced within the
reservation's present boundaries about 20 years
later. Today, the reservation covers about
1.2 million acres of the Lower Flathead Valley,
including the southern half of Flathead Lake
and the western side of the Mission Mountains.
Portion Owned by Tribes or Individual Indians:
about 50 percent.
Tribal Membership: about 6,200.
Number of Flatheads Living on Reservation: about 3,800.
Total Reservation Population: about 19,600.
Number of Whites Living on Reservation: about 15,800.
Tribal Unemployment: 27 percent (BIA 1985).
Percentage of Flathead Indians Living in Poverty:
35 percent (1980 Census).
Estimated Tribal Revenue, 1985: $12.5 million, of which
$9 million came from Montana Power Co.'s rent
payment for Kerr Dam.
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